Blackmail
by digby
Every converstation I’ve had with people about this port deal, on both the right and the left, has been one of complete befuddlement. Why on earth would Bush do something this politically obtuse? After all the fearmongering and the talk about “oceans don’t protect us” for the last four years it’s just inexplicable that they would go to the wall for a deal that looks so terrible.
Just now I sleepily clicked over to Atrios and read this, which just makes it even more unbelievable:
The Central Intelligence Agency did not target Al Qaeda chief Osama bin laden once as he had the royal family of the United Arab Emirates with him in Afghanistan, the agency’s director, George Tenet, told the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States on Thursday.
Had the CIA targeted bin Laden, half the royal family would have been wiped out as well, he said.
Here’s the bit from the 9/11 report which doesn’t explicitly name the royal family:
The Desert Camp, February 1999
Early in 1999, the CIA received reporting that Bin Ladin was spending much of his time at one of several camps in the Afghan desert south of Kandahar. At the beginning of February, Bin Ladin was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Sheikh Ali camp, a desert hunting camp being used by visitors from a Gulf state. Public sources have stated that these visitors were from the United Arab Emirates.
Reporting from the CIA’s assets provided a detailed description of the hunting camp, including its size, location, resources, and security, as well as of Bin Ladin’s smaller, adjacent camp. Because this was not in an urban area, missiles launched against it would have less risk of causing collateral damage. On February 8, the military began to ready itself for a possible strike. The next day, national technical intelligence confirmed the location and description of the larger camp and showed the nearby presence of an official aircraft of the United Arab Emirates. But the location of Bin Ladin’s quarters could not be pinned down so precisely.The CIA did its best to answer a host of questions about the larger camp and its residents and about Bin Ladin’s daily schedule and routines to support military contingency planning. According to reporting from the tribals, Bin Ladin regularly went from his adjacent camp to the larger camp where he visited the Emiratis; the tribals expected him to be at the hunting camp for such a visit at least until midmorning on February 11. Clarke wrote to Berger’s deputy on February 10 that the military was then doing targeting work to hit the main camp with cruise missiles and should be in position to strike the following morning. Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert appears to have been briefed on the situation.
No strike was launched. By February 12 Bin Ladin had apparently moved on, and the immediate strike plans became moot. According to CIA and Defense officials, policymakers were concerned about the danger that a strike would kill an Emirati prince or other senior officials who might be with Bin Ladin or close by. Clarke told us the strike was called off after consultations with Director Tenet because the intelligence was dubious, and it seemed to Clarke as if the CIA was presenting an option to attack America’s best counterterrorism ally in the Gulf. The lead CIA official in the field, Gary Schroen, felt that the intelligence reporting in this case was very reliable; the Bin Ladin unit chief, “Mike,” agreed. Schroen believes today that this was a lost opportunity to kill Bin Ladin before 9/11.
Even after Bin Ladin’s departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Ladin. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former Bin Ladin unit chief found out about Clarke’s call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke’s phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate. “Mike” thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Ladin.
The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem. From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban’s only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11.
In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Ladin.166 The Taliban did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplomat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan radicals offered a counterbalance to “Iranian dangers” in the region, but he also noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.
What a tangled web. It certainly appears that the UAE has us wrapped around their little fingers, doesn’t it? And it’s not just that they are “both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem.” They are holding something else over our heads as well (again via Atrios):
But he said he would withhold judgment on the deal’s national security implications until after today’s briefing. The United Arab Emirates provides docking rights for more U.S. Navy ships than any other nation in the region, Warner noted. He added: “If they say they have not been treated fairly in this, we run the risk of them pulling back some of that support at a critical time of the war.”
This is obviously a very complicated relationship, which explains why Bush was singing kumbaaya around the drum circle yesterday asking everyone to give peace a chance.
But here’s the thing. Bush has been playing politics with this complicated situation for years now, saying things like “you’re either with us or you’re with the terrorists.” He spent the entire presidential campaign taunting John Kerry for allegedly requiring a “global test” and using his applause lines like a bludgeon:
I will never hand over America’s security decisions to foreign leaders and international bodies that do not have America’s interests at heart.
… the senator would have America bend over backwards to satisfy a handful of governments with agendas different from our own.
This is my opponent’s alliance-building strategy: brush off your best friends, fawn over your critics. And that is no way to gain the respect of the world.
Here’s some vintage Bush cowboy bullshit trash talk, from just last week:
First, when we see threats, we’ve got to deal with them. When I was growing up in West Texas, oceans protected us. You might remember some of those days. Old Mayor Martinez, I know he remembers those days when we felt pretty comfortable here in America. We could see a threat overseas, but oceans made it pretty clear that — to a lot of folks — that nothing would happen, you know. September 11th came along and made it clear that we are vulnerable, that the enemy can hit us if they — if they want to.
And therefore, when you see a threat, you’ve got to deal with it. You can’t take things for granted anymore. The best way to deal with this enemy is to defeat them overseas so we don’t have to face them here at home, and to stay on the hunt. (Applause.) And that’s what we’re doing.
And we’ve got a coalition of countries. I spent a lot of time reminding people about the nature of the war. Listen, the tendency for folks is to say, well, this really isn’t a war. I can understand that. Who wants to walk around thinking there’s a war about to hit us. I mean, that’s — that’s my job to worry about it, not yours. How can you have an economy recover from a recession if people are afraid to risk capital because they’re worried about thinking something is going to happen? And the same thing happens overseas. People kind of want to slip to the comfortable. They don’t believe it’s a war, some of them, and I understand that. And so we spend a lot of time reminding people that we’ve got to work together because the enemy can’t stand what we stand for, and that’s freedom. They just hate freedom. And so we’ve got a good coalition, and — and we’re on the hunt. We’re keeping the pressure on them. It’s hard to plot and plan and execute attacks when you’re on the run.
And so the first step of our strategy is defeat them there so we don’t to have to face them here. And we’ve got some great special forces — I met the special forces command guy here — and there’s great intelligence officers and wonderful coalition folks. We’re cutting off their money. It makes it kind of hard to operate when you can’t get your bank accounts full of money in order to — we’re just doing a lot of stuff. And it’s important for citizens to know that there’s a constant, constant pressure. I think about it every day.
And we’re making progress — Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, September the 11th plotter-planner, is incarcerated; his successor brought to justice. Slowly but surely, we’re finding them where they hide, and they know we’re on their trail.
Secondly, we got to deny them safe haven. These people can’t operate without safe haven. It’s an interesting war we’re in. It’s totally different from what we’re used to because we’re not — we’re not facing nation-states; we’re dealing with an enemy that is international in nature, that hides in states.
When the President says something like, if you harbor a terrorist, you’re equally as guilty as the terrorist, those words mean nothing unless you act upon them. And I said that to the people of Afghanistan — the Taliban. They didn’t listen. And so we acted. And removing the Taliban — (applause) — is a clear signal that we won’t tolerate safe haven. In other words, if you harbor the terrorist, you’re just as guilty as the murderers. And that’s a clear signal that the United States must continue to send in order to win the war on terror.
But, it was never quite that simple was it? We aren’t in a “war” as it is commonly understood, are we? Our “enemies” are sometimes our “allies” and things change from one day to the next. It’s complicated and — dare I say it — nuanced . Our security can’t be assured by simply flexing our muscles and roaring like beasts.
But, after years of that puerile chest beating he can’t expect everybody to do a big 180 and accept this crap:
I want those who are questioning it to step up and explain why all of a sudden a Middle Eastern company is held to a different standard than a Great British (sic) company. I’m trying to conduct foreign policy now by saying to people of the world, we’ll treat you fairly. And after careful scrutiny, we believe this deal is a legitimate deal that will not jeopardize the security of the country, and at the same time, send that signal that we’re willing to treat people fairly.”
Is it any wonder that this whole thing has brought about extreme cognitive dissonance?
It may be that we have gotten ourselves into a terrible position in which we cannot “offend” the UAE by blocking this deal because they may reciprocate by blocking access to their deep water ports. If that’s the case, then we are being blackmailed by the UAE for big money and potentially putting our own ports in danger in the process. According to the 9/11 report they have been playing both ends against the middle for years. And we have Yosemite Sam and Quickdraw McGraw in charge of dealing with them. It’s not a big surprise that the whole thing is blowing up in their faces.
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