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Month: August 2021

Biden is willing to be that guy

Kevin Drum has some smart thoughts on this:

This is why we stayed in Afghanistan so long: no president wanted to be the one who “lost Afghanistan.” Because of this, a war we should have exited at least a decade ago lasted twice as long as it should have.

But put that aside for a moment and let’s zoom in on recent events. Who’s really to blame for the events of the past couple of months? Who’s to blame for the obviously disastrous collapse of the Afghan military and the rushed evacuation of US personnel?

For partisan reasons, Republicans will blame Biden. Even some Democrats and policy experts will do the same. But it just isn’t so. Nobody wants to say this out loud, but the real blame lies with the US military.

In a broad sense, of course, they’re the ones who were never able to carry out their training mission in the first place. But in a narrower sense, they’re also the ones who gave consistently bad advice to Biden practically from the day he entered office. How long would it take the Taliban to take over once the drawdown was in progress? At least six months, they said, and they acted accordingly. In reality, it took weeks, not months, and the result is the panicked evacuation we’re now seeing.

Nobody ever wants to blame the military for failures in the field. For one thing, there’s no partisan advantage in it. For another, the military knows how to fight back in news outlets, in Congress, and in the public eye. Nobody in Washington wants to make an enemy of them.

But make no mistake: Civilian policymakers made plenty of mistakes in Afghanistan, but it was the US military that was behind all these failures. They provided bad advice. They failed in their mission. They were never able to understand the country they were occupying. This is the story that needs to be written.

And he has a much longer post on what went wrong militarily. Highly recommend:

Josh Marshall also had some interesting, similar, thoughts on this:

Americans, or at least the commentating classes, are watching aghast as events unfold in Afghanistan. Some are second-guessing the wisdom of withdrawal – after all, how hard is it to maintain a few thousand soldiers there permanently? Others are taking the more comfortable position of saying yes, we had to leave but this just wasn’t the right way. I must be the only person in America who is having exactly the opposite reaction. The more I see the more I’m convinced this was the right decision – both what I see on the ground in Afghanistan and perhaps even more the reaction here in the United States.

It is crystal clear that the Afghan national army and really the Afghan state was an illusion. It could not survive first contact with a post-US military reality. As is so often the case in life – with bad investments, bad relationships – what we were doing there was staying to delay our reckoning with the consequences of the reality of the situation.

That’s a bad idea.

But as I’ve said in other posts over the last two days, we knew this part. What has been deeply revealing to me is the American response. And here I mean to say the most prominent media and political voices. It’s true this is quicker than I’d figured – not that I’d given the precise timing a lot of thought. And it seems to be quicker than the White House figured. But by a month? Three months? Does that matter? I don’t see why. If anything, given the outcome, quicker is better – since a protracted fall is necessarily a bloodier fall. But what the reaction has demonstrated to me is the sheer depth of denial. The inability to accept the reality of the situation. And thus the excuse making. Sen. Maggie Hassan’s press release below is a painfully good example of that. So is this article by in The Atlantic by George Packer. Virtually everything Richard Engel has been writing on Twitter for the last 24 hours. All so much the cant of empire. But more than this, far more important than this, simply unwise.

For better or worse I am bought into the post-World War II American project. This makes me much more conventional in my thinking about foreign policy and national security than a significant percentage of TPM Readers. I note this here because I don’t come to any of this with the assumption that it’s none of our business or that we’re a malign force in the world. I’m bought in. Indeed, my instinctive caution probably would have made me hesitate to make this unilateral move. You can always kick the can a bit further down the road.

The perpetual effort to stand up an Afghan government that could exist on its own did not work. That doesn’t mean the decision to topple the Taliban government in 2001 was a mistake. But that was twenty years ago. We are living in a dramatically different world today. We have been in a perpetual occupation in pursuit of no clear national security interest of the United States. At a certain point you have to realize that and act accordingly. I find convincing this suggestion that Biden refused a more phased or circumstances-based withdrawal precisely because he had seen up close how Barack Obama had been rolled by the Pentagon a decade ago.

In 122 AD the Emperor Hadrian built what history knows as “Hadrian’s Wall”, which bisects Britain. You can still see it today. It marked the northernmost boundary of the Roman Empire. On this side Rome; on that side the tribes of Caledonia. Some twenty years later in 142 AD the Emperor Antoninus Pius, frustrated with the marauding and managing the tribes north of wall, constructed a new wall roughly one hundred miles further north into what is now Scotland. This was the Antonine Wall. Rome would garrison and pacify the region between the two walls. Twenty years later in 162 AD, the year after Antonius Pius died, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius abandoned the new territory and withdrew back to Hadrian’s Wall. Not everything works.

The intensity of the current handwringing over the fall of Kabul is an almost perfect measure of the denial about the failure of the current mission. Indeed, they are two sides of the same coin. What was keeping us there this long? THIS! Look at it around you today. The collective unwillingness to endure this reality is what has kept the US in the country for at least a decade. Processing ten years of denial in ten hours is rough.

We’ve been in Afghanistan for either ten or twenty years because no one in authority was ready to endure this moment and not look back. I don’t know if Biden will pay a domestic political price for this denouement. But watching it all unfold I’m even more certain he made the right decision than I was even a day ago. Does anyone think we’ll look back a year from now and think, wow, I wish we were still garrisoning Afghanistan? I doubt it.

Someone had to make the decision that Bush, Obama and Trump did not and apparently could not. Biden did.

Just STFU

Yep:

Also:

Let’s not forget

https://twitter.com/travisakers/status/1427008000498225153

Dave Weigel  @daveweigel6m

How quickly can the politics around Afghanistan change? Here’s a section on the RNC’s website in June; click it now and you get a 404 error. (Rest of page was about Kosovo/Israel-Arab deals.) gop.com/president-trum…

Don’t even look at the drivel Trump is putting out about this. He is the one who gave the Taliban political legitimacy and made the deal that would have required a full blown escalation if Biden tried to renege. Not that Biden wanted to. He ran on withdrawal and was determined not to fall into the previous traps of “just a few more months” or the “we need to escalate before we can withdraw” fallacy. He’s kept his word, working with the conditions on the ground he inherited, which was 2500 troops and a Taliban enemy that had been on the move for months.

More reflex-sion

A young Afghan Nuristani girl at a Kabul, Afghanistan orphanage in January 2002. Alexander the Great’s army left behind DNA on its trek through Afghanistan on the way to India in the 4th century B.C. Photo by Barbara Millucci via Flickr (CC BY 2.0).

As anyone could predict, the GOP will reflexively wash its hands of any responsibility for the 20-year Afghan adventure begun by Pres. George W. Bush. They’d do the same if somehow their avatar of presidentiality had reclaimed his throne last week. But he didn’t. Joe Biden sits at the Resolute Desk.

E.J. Dionne writes:

Over the decades, conservatives have been enormously successful at selling a parody of liberalism. Liberals are cast as dreamy idealists who think “throwing money at problems” is the way to solve them. They’re painted as hostile to a tough-minded examination of their programs and indifferent to whether they work.

This parody has things exactly backward. In 2021, it’s liberals who want citizens, politicians included, to look rigorously at the evidence.

The evidence against making a nation-state out of Afghanistan was visible to anyone with any sense of history.

Eric Boehlert remarks on the “blame Biden” impulse of the press:

Treating the Taliban’s seizure of Afghanistan’s capitol over the weekend as a shocking event in the wake of U.S. troops withdrawing from the war-torn country, the press eagerly jumped into the blame game. In the process, they diligently did the GOP’s bidding by omitting key context in its rush to pin the blame for a 20-year, extraordinarily complex and heartbreaking military and foreign policy failure on a single man who took office just seven months ago.

Turning over their platforms to partisan Republicans and pro-war military experts, the media seemed eager to portray President Joe Biden as one being swallowed up in “crisis,” even as his call to withdraw troops has drawn overwhelming, bipartisan support at home.

Axios laid it on thick. Doubling as a GOP springboard, the news outlet made sweeping factual declarations in its news coverage: “Rarely has an American president’s predictions been so wrong, so fast, so convincingly as Biden on Afghanistan.”

Etc., etc.

“Raise your hand if you remember the predictions President George W. Bush made about invading Iraq, long before the U.S. spent $2 trillion and more than 500,000 people died,” Boehlert writes.

The Washington Post editorial board, which in 2002 and 2003 published nearly 30 endorsements advocating for the invasion of Iraq, howled that the troop withdrawal had been “precipitous.”

That drew a sharp rebuke from Rajan Menon, a professor of international relations at the Powell School, City College of New York:

Precipitous? Is this really an accurate characterization of a military campaign that has lasted close to 20 years and that cost close to $90 billion just to train the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces — and almost $2.3 trillion if all other costs are added in, including $815.7 billion in war-related and reconstruction expenses

A large chunk of Sunday’s coverage simply consisted of journalists recording Republicans’ completely predictable attacks on Biden. “Republican lawmakers are denouncing President Biden’s admin. for the Taliban’s aggressive takeover of Afghanistan,” NBC News excitedly announced on Twitter. What Biden’s Republican critics would do in Afghanistan in terms of ending the United States’ presence was never addressed, nor was any historical context offered.

[…]

When Biden announced earlier this year that all U.S. troops were coming home from Afghanistan, 70 percent of Americans supported the move, including 56 percent support from Republicans.

But now everyone is shocked, shocked that intelligence Biden relied on was so bad and that there was so little time to evacuate allies because Afghanistan would fall to the Taliban so quickly. No one could have seen that coming, right? Much less do anything to stop it.

Short memories

Everybody remembers we didn’t go into Afghanistan in Oct. 2001 to fight the Taliban and a civil war, right? Just so we’re clear.

Because a lot of people who were sure of that just a short time ago will suddenly behave as if the Earth’s magnetic pole has flipped. They will insist Joe Biden owns the chaos on the ground in Afghanistan this morning. I touched on our short memories yesterday.

Balloon Juice collected just a sampling. I’ve added some others:

https://twitter.com/travisakers/status/1427008000498225153?s=20

This is easier to read:

LAPD Proud Boys

Reports of a violent assault by the Proud Boys in LA yesterday:

This is literally immediately in front of LAPD headquarters.

https://twitter.com/chadloder/status/1426661674145050626

100 W 1st Street in LA if you want to check it out for yourself on streetview

A fight didn’t just “break out” and the reporters plural weren’t attacked by nameless phantoms. The Proud Boys—a fascist street gang that tried to overthrow the republic earlier this year—assembled and deliberately assaulted journalists and others.

Tony Moon, the proud boy seen assaulting a reporter and screaming “unmask them all” in front of LAPD headquarters, thanks the department for allowing his mayhem. Previously, Moon acknowledged that he participated in storming the US Capitol on January 6th. He hasn’t been arrested.

Originally tweeted by southpaw (@nycsouthpaw) on August 15, 2021.

It appears that LAPD was openly on the side of the Proud Boys. They tweeted that the altercation was incited by Antifa with no mention of the PBs. They later “edited” their tweet but as you can see below, the NAACP legal defense caught the original tweet and want an explanation. We all should. Reporters were assaulted by the Proud Boys yesterday right outside LAPD headquarters. And LAPD blamed Antifa.

https://twitter.com/Sifill_LDF/status/1426727293737742342

When the cops take the side of the street thugs against the press we have a very big problem on our hands.

Meanwhile:

Where we stand with COVID

The following from Andy Slavitt is very informative. I don’t think we’ve wrapped our minds around the permanent changes that are going to be required. They aren’t onerous but they are different in some small ways (mask wearing as something common during outbreaks) that seem to be turning some people in our country into raving lunatics.

Anyway:

COVID Update: I’ve had dozens of people ask me with Delta here, what is the COVID end game.

Because I don’t know, I interviewed 6 experts on various elements— variants, vaccines, global, policy, ev biology & historical precedence.

Will break it down here.

First of all, one truism is that when cases are rising, more say the virus is here forever. When cases are dropping, people tend to believe it’s over.

We’re all caught up in that still which makes objectivity harder to find.

Still, we have learned a lot with Delta’s emergence that seems to change the game.

Some theories seem more right than wrong to me….

1- The virus & science will continue to have a long battle with a virus continually mutating for survival.

How long? We are still seeing mutations from the 1918 flu 103 years later.

2- Given Delta’s contagiousness & the fitness of future mutations in order to beat it, this means SARS-CoV-2 will be contagious enough that everyone will get the virus.

The aim is simply that more people get it be vaccinated when they do so fewer get COVID.

3- The virus & the disease are not the safe thing.

The mRNA vaccines are a godsend & will help us minimize COVID-19 even while there remains an abundance of SARS-CoV-2.

I will explain that further.

The vaccines don’t work like sunscreen, stopping the virus from entering your body. They fight for our cells.

What they do is train our immune system to recognize the virus, attack it, & fight it to a state where it minimizes damage.

This is why there are many harmless breakthrough cases. Stick a swab in your nose while your immune system is waging the fight & you will test positive.

This also explains a few things we see in Delta:
-immunosuppressed people need more vaccine
-higher Delta viral loads cause symptoms by making the fight harder
-while the immune system reacts, Delta can live in your nose for a short period & infect others

3- Can the vaccines keep up with future variants? Most experts appear confident in the mRNA platform— even when a variant potentially beats a current vaccine.

Here’s how & why from my understanding…

The science of the virus itself makes it a good target with the spike protein. And so long as the virus creates an immune response, mRNA can be adapted to simulate it.

It’s one reason why there isn’t an HIV vaccine. The body can’t mount a response on its own. Not so for SC2.

mRNA is also most easily scaled & manufactured & can react to new mutants in 90 days. Regulations from FDA & other bodies are being adapted to keep up. We need nimble manufacturing & distribution as well.

4- All of this means likely waves of COVID— regionally & seasonally— depending on community vax status. It means some less safe periods of time— when vaccines are catching up to mutations, when prevalence is high. And safer times.

Here are some implications & immediate priorities.

1- Accelerate global vax effort. Instead of 70% by Dec 2022, we need 70% by March 22. The difference in giving the virus less time as we attack it is critical. A slow attack means more time for it to find ways to adapt.

2- US pockets of low vaccination are a critical priority. We are rapidly falling behind the ROW in vax levels due to hesitancy.

Vax requirements will eventually be fairly common place. The difference between this happening this year & next could be profound.

3- The development of an oral anti-viral is an essential tool. Along with better ventilated buildings, we can keep transmission low & make infections shorter & milder.

4- Research & development of treatments for long COVID must begin now & there is reason for hope that we will find both symptom relief & clues to better treatment quickly if we put our minds to it.

So if the picture I pieced together from experts is close to right. And we execute against these 4 priorities, what does our new normal look like?

In many ways it looks like the old normal for much of the world that we have so far largely avoided in the US & parallels how we deal with other challenges.

These are things we should be willing to tolerate:

-Masks when we travel & in heavy seasons
-Staying home when we’re sick— always
-Weather reports as there on for smog or allergy seasons
-Periodic outbreaks
-Caution around key populations
-Showing we are vaccinated/tested

But there is something we can decide not to tolerate:

Preventable deaths.

100 people die every day from the flu in a bad season, mostly elderly & kids. We should not accept this. And we should not accept even more from COVID.

We can science our way through most of it. But we have to manage our way there as well— and that’s where the challenge lies.

Our ability to have a productive debate on these issues will need to get better.

Domestically one can imagine 2 political parties— one for protecting the public, one for “liberty.”

The global cooperation & leadership needed for this is profound. Protectionism would lead us down a predictably more difficult path.

Investments in basic research, in providing support for people with jobs which expose them to risks & for accessibility for people at risk or sick will expensive. But necessary.

But if I think about what matters, it’s this— to create a future where we all of us get to have as bright a future as possible.

Small sacrifices & winning some big arguments are part of building that future.

Originally tweeted by Andy Slavitt 🇺🇸💉 (@ASlavitt) on August 14, 2021.

Hubris and humiliation

I too am on vacation this week, so I’m really just sharing some of the more interesting commentary about this Afghanistan situation today. Here’s one from the Boston Globe’s Michel Cohen:

Though I’m supposed to be on vacation this week, I had a few thoughts I wanted to pass along on the tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan. Earlier today, the country’s president, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country, making the Taliban’s takeover a mere formality at this point.

The speed of the Taliban’s military conquest is astonishing. A week ago, the insurgents didn’t control a single one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. By the end of the day, they will likely rule the country.

Now the United States is feverishly helicoptering its diplomats from the American embassy in Kabul to the airport for departure from the country. The images are reminiscent of Saigon 1975, and the retreat of US diplomats from Saigon as the North Vietnamese military approached the city.

While it’s always dangerous to make direct historical analogies, one similarity is apparent in both conflicts: the US propped up corrupt governments that lacked broad popular support and collapsed when forced to fight on their own. The US ignored the unique cultural and political dynamics in both places and instead tried to create and sustain governments and militaries styled after an American model. Riven by corruption and incompetent leadership, neither government could elicit the popular support necessary to keep them in power without direct US support.

The US spent years and billions of dollars building up and training the South Vietnamese army. By 1974, it had the sixth-largest air force in the world. Yet, it was little match for a rival military with better leadership and a cause for which rank-and-file soldiers were willing to fight and die. In Afghanistan, the US spent $83 billion on training and arming a supposedly 300,000 man army. Unlike the South Vietnamese, which tried to stop the North Vietnamese offensive in 1975, the Afghan security forces barely bothered to fight.

For those who inveighed against the US war in Vietnam — and those of us who railed against US policy in Afghanistan — the outcome in both conflicts was not surprising. It always felt inevitable. Indeed, I wrote this nearly 11 years ago after traveling to Afghanistan as an election monitor. I’m just surprised it took this long to come to fruition:

It seems clear that President Obama and General Petraeus ought to devise an alternative strategy for Afghanistan centered less on ‘winning’ and more on doing everything possible to stabilize Afghanistan, preparing for a turnover of power to Afghan security forces and preventing a full national meltdown, before an eventual and certain U.S. withdrawal. And yet from every indication the sheer bleakness of the situation isn’t reflected at all in U.S. military operations and strategy.

…. Two days after the election I sat down with an Afghan TV journalist who said that while it was moving to see Afghans risking their lives to vote, the sight ought not to conceal the worsening insecurity and despair that defines his country nearly nine years after the Americans first arrived.

In an apt description of Afghanistan’s predicament and the shrinking set of options facing U.S. policymakers, he said to me, “Afghanistan is a very dark house with only a single flickering candle lighting the inside.”

The Afghanistan die was cast years ago. It began in 2001 when Western policymakers and a handful of Afghans gathered in Bonn, Germany, and drafted a new constitution creating a highly centralized central government. The decision was spectacularly ill-attuned to Afghan history and culture, which has long rejected direct rule from Kabul and prized local autonomy. It continued for the next several years as the US rejected pleas from the Taliban to be allowed back in the country if they laid down their arms.

It became more entrenched as President George W. Bush ignored the signs of worsening security and a rising Taliban threat to focus instead on another misbegotten conflict in Iraq.

President Obama picked up the baton in 2009 when he agreed to send another nearly 50,000 troops to fight in Afghanistan, with no clear political strategy for stabilizing the country or ending the civil war and an 18-month timetable for withdrawal that the Taliban could — and did — wait out. Rather than preparing Afghanistan for an eventual US retreat, the US military (supported by much of the DC foreign policy elite) convinced itself that it could wage a successful counterinsurgency against the Taliban. American troops were sent to fight and die in locales like Helmand province, even though it was evident, at the time, that the Afghan government could likely never hold the territory after the US departed. Even until this week, the Afghan government continued to try and maintain its presence in every corner of the country, long after it became clear that it could not sustain such an effort.

President Trump inherited the mess that Obama and Bush had created and made it worse, signing away the last remnants of US leverage with the Doha agreement and cutting the Afghan government off at the knees by leaving them out of the negotiations. But, in fairness, by the time Trump took office, there weren’t many good options left for US policymakers.

When Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he had two choices in Afghanistan: renege on Doha and maintain a US troop presence or finally end America’s longest war. If he had done the former, he would have put US troops directly in harm’s way since one of the key provisions of the Doha agreement is a pledge by the Taliban not to target American soldiers (a promise the insurgent group kept).

Indeed, every armchair pundit arguing today that Joe Biden should not have withdrawn from Afghanistan (whether they realize it or not) is saying they are comfortable with renewed Taliban attacks on US troops. How many more US soldiers needed to die for an ally that didn’t want to fight and had little popular support? Considering how quickly the Afghan government has collapsed over the past week, they are also basically asserting that US troops should have never left the country. After all, does anyone think that after 20 years of fighting, another six weeks, six months, or six years would have produced a different outcome than what we see today? Short of a US pledge to never leave Afghanistan, this day was almost certainly coming.

https://twitter.com/gelliottmorris/status/1426946086313267201?s=20

But then again, when has the foreign policy elite ever cared about what the American people think?

Biden’s decision — even if it was the right one — is leading to a tragic and awful outcome. But, make no mistake, the capturing of Kabul and the Taliban’s return to power didn’t just happen. It was years in the making, informed by a military leadership that kept claiming, against all evidence on the ground, that the US was “turning the corner” in Afghanistan; by a US political leadership that treated the war like a proverbial red-headed stepchild; and by a public that stopped caring about Afghanistan a long time ago.

I grieve for the Afghan people and those who signed up to work with US forces and whose lives are now in danger. They deserved a better fate. However, if there is any silver lining from this week’s events, it’s that the Afghan government’s quick collapse will spare the country more deadly fighting. One can only hope now that the Taliban learned a lesson from their disastrous earlier rule and, this time, will adopt a more moderate approach toward leading the country.

I seethe with anger at those who argued against history, culture, and common sense more than a decade ago in claiming that the US military could “outgovern” the Taliban and sway the Afghan people toward their side. They should publicly apologize. And I feel immense sympathy for the families of those American soldiers who gave their last full measure of devotion for a war that its political leaders never believed in and its military leaders were never honest about. They deserved better leadership.

As I wrote earlier this month, the tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan “is a quintessentially American failure — a collective one 20 years in the making, the result of American hubris and a misguided belief in what U.S. power can achieve.”

Rather than recriminations, we’d all be better off learning that lesson on this truly awful day.

https://twitter.com/JamesFallows/status/1426979662136283138

Catastrophe

Afghanistan updates: Taliban cuts off Kabul from east as Biden sends more  US troops - ABC News
Kandahar, Afghanistan, August 12, 2021

On September 11, 2001, I knew the following were true:

1. The atrocities were directly due to the negligence and incompetence of the Bush administration
2. War with Afghanistan was both inevitable and a disastrous mistake, strategically and morally
3. It would end exactly the way the Vietnam war ended

My prescience was not that special. That’s what’s so frightening. Millions of others felt the same way, but no one in a position of influence or power did. Or if they did, none thought it was politically astute to condemn Bush for his criminal stupidity or loudly oppose the sheer madness of invading Afghanistan.

There is indeed a world climate crisis. And a world health crisis. But not coincidentally, there is a world intellectual crisis among leaders.

The end

Sky News reports this from the Taliban today as they take over Kabul. Pray that they are actually going to be as restrained as they are saying, (if those forms of punishment can be called “restrained.”) It’s very hard to believe:

Taliban spokesman: We seek an inclusive government that includes all Afghan parties — Sky News

Taliban spokesman: We will allow women to educate and work, wearing the hijab — Sky News

Taliban spokesman: We will allow women to leave the house alone

Taliban: We will allow the media to criticize as long as it does not turn into a “moral assassination” — As Sharq

Taliban spokesman: Punishments such as execution, stoning and amputation will depend on court ruling

Meanwhile Kabul: People are painting the women pictures

Originally tweeted by Ragıp Soylu (@ragipsoylu) on August 15, 2021.

This piece by Greg Jaffe in the Washington Post struck me as a thoughtful reflection on this mess:

Twenty years ago, when the twin towers and the Pentagon were still smoldering, there was a sense among America’s warrior and diplomatic class that history was starting anew for the people of Afghanistan and much of the Muslim world.

“Every nation has a choice to make,” President George W. Bush said on the day that bombs began falling on Oct. 7, 2001. In private, senior U.S. diplomats were even more explicit. “For you and us, history starts today,” then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage told his Pakistani counterparts.

This was the original sin. This swaggering hubris. Anyone could have seen that it was complete bullshit if they could see past the primitive desire for revenge.

“We assumed the rest of the world saw us as we saw ourselves,” he said. “And we believed that we could shape the world in our image using our guns and our money.” Both assumptions ignored Afghan culture, politics and history. Both, he said, were tragically wrong.

The near-collapse of the Afghan army in the space of just a few stunning weeks is prompting the military and Washington’s policymakers to reflect on their failures over the course of nearly two decades. To many, the roots of the disaster go back to the war’s earliest days, when the Taliban was first driven from power and the United States, still reeling from the shock of the 9/11 attacks, set about building a government in Kabul.

The Afghanistan Papers: Afghan security forces, despite years of training, were dogged by incompetence and corruption

Some two dozen prominent Afghans met in Bonn, Germany, with officials from the U.S. government, NATO and the United Nations to form a new Afghan government crafted in the image of the United States and its European allies.

“You look at the Afghan constitution that was created in Bonn and it was trying to create a Western democracy,” said Michèle Flournoy, one of the architects of President Barack Obama’s troop surge in Afghanistan in 2010. “In retrospect, the United States and its allies got it really wrong from the very beginning. The bar was set based on our democratic ideals, not on what was sustainable or workable in an Afghan context.”

Flournoy acknowledged in hindsight that the mistake was compounded across Republican and Democratic administrations, which continued with almost equal fervor to pursue goals that ran counter to decades — if not centuries — of the Afghan experience.

By 2009, when Obama took office, it was clear to just about everyone that the United States was losing the war.

To reverse Taliban momentum and give U.S. officials a chance to build up the Afghan government and security forces, Obama signed off on a surge of troops that more than doubled the size of the American force in Afghanistan.

Flournoy said she was initially hopeful that the plan could work. On trips to Afghanistan, she met frequently with young Afghans, including women’s groups, who shared America’s vision for the country. They wanted to send their daughters to school, serve in government, start businesses and nonprofits. They wanted women to be full participants in society and craved a predictable political and legal system. “We found all kinds of allies,” she said.

But those individuals were no match for the rot that had permeated the Afghan government. She and other U.S. officials understood that with all the U.S. money floating around in Afghanistan, there would be “petty corruption,” she said. What U.S. officials discovered in 2010, after the surge was already underway, was a corruption that ran far deeper than they had previously understood and that jeopardized their strategy, which depended on building the legitimacy of the Afghan government.

“We realized that this is not going to work,” Flournoy said. “We had made a big bet only to learn that our local partner was rotten.”

Now, as Taliban fighters race toward Kabul and the Afghan military crumbles, Flournoy said her thoughts often turn to the Americans who sacrificed for the mission and to those “wonderful allies” who shared the U.S. hopes for a democratic Afghanistan. “That’s what makes me so sick to my stomach,” she said. “We invested in this whole generation that is about to suffer through this very horrible chapter.”

Meanwhile, current and former U.S. officials are trying to make sense of why a government and security forces built over two decades at a cost of more than $100 billion dollars are collapsing so quickly.

Carter Malkasian, a longtime adviser to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, has pegged the weakness of the Afghan forces on their lack of a unifying cause that resonates with Afghans, as well as their heavy dependence on the United States. By contrast, Taliban members were fighting for their culture and Islam. They “exemplified something that inspired, something that made them powerful in battle, something closely tied to what it meant to be an Afghan,” Malkasian writes in his new book, “The American War in Afghanistan.”

It’s an observation that speaks to the limits of American power and raises the broader question of how the catastrophic and embarrassing failure in Afghanistan might constrain U.S. foreign policy moving forward.

“We know what happens when we fall to imperial hubris. What does one do with imperial heartbreak?” asked John Gans, who served as a civilian in the Pentagon during the Obama administration.

So many of today’s rising military commanders and foreign policy experts were drawn into government service by the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan. After the relatively low-stakes peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, America and U.S. foreign policy suddenly seemed to be at the center of the world in the years after 2001. A whole generation of leaders driven “by ambition, ego and a desire to shape world events” ran toward the action, Gans said.

Their numbers include lawmakers such as Rep. Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), who joined the CIA, and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), who signed up for the infantry, as well as top Biden foreign policy officials, such as Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.

It seems certain that in coming years the use of military force will be informed by this searing experience. U.S. foreign policy will be guided by more modest ambitions, especially when weighing the use of military power. Flournoy imagines a future in which military force is limited to more sharply defined objectives and informed by far greater humility when it comes to spreading democracy or changing societies.

In many cases, it’s a vision in which force is used to manage chronic problems, rather than solve them.

Another possibility is a U.S. foreign policy that is increasingly focused more on issues such as pandemics or climate change, which require U.S. leadership and a global response. Gans noted that more than 600,000 Americans have died of covid-19, far more than the number of U.S. lives lost to terrorism and war over the past 20 years.

For now, though, it seems unlikely that these threats will take center stage in U.S. foreign policy. The Pentagon, with its $740 billion budget, still sucks up a larger share of discretionary spending than any other government agency. Meanwhile, the foreign policy establishment has shifted its focus increasingly to the competition with the likes of Russia and China.

“After 9/11, everyone raced to become a Middle East or counterterrorism expert,” said Gans. “After covid, you don’t see many foreign policy people racing to become global health experts.”

On one subject most foreign policy experts agree: America needs to temper its faith in its armed forces. “We had so much faith in our military that we were inevitably going to overstep,” said Dempsey, the Afghanistan veteran. “A military bureaucracy unchecked never yields good outcomes.”

It was a decision made out of impulse to strike back. Could it ever have ended any other way than this?

Update:

Peter Galbraith

19h  · I watch the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan with disbelief and horror. I first visited the country with the mujahideen on February 14, 1989–the day the Soviets withdrew –and served there as Deputy Head of the UN mission in 2009.

So much went wrong but here is my very partial list of those most responsible for the fiasco.

1. The Afghan political and military leaders who were more interested in staying in power than doing anything while in office except for stealing as much as they could.

2. The US government which pumped so much money into Afghanistan that there was a lot to steal and it was easily stolen.

3. Hamid Karzai–Afghanistan’s first president was corrupt, ineffective, weird, and–after the massive fraud that accompanied his reelection, illegitimate. In 2009, he organized the fraud that got him a second term. That enabled him and his cronies to steal everything else.

4. Ban ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General who tolerated the massive fraud in the UN sponsored (and paid for) Afghanistan 2009 presidential elections. This undermined Obama’s surge which may have been the last chance to get it right.

5. David Petraeus, the other US military commanders and the so called strategic thinkers who all declared the Afghanistan War to be a counter-insurgency and also stated that successful counter-insuegencies require a local partner. They then pretended the corrupt Afghan government was a real partner when they knew it wasn’t.

6. USAID which built roads intended to raise rural incomes by getting farm products to market but actually enabled corrupt police to shakedown farmers. This won the Taliban new supporters and the new roads gave the Taliban speedy access to previously defensible areas like the Pansjir Valley (which neither the Soviets or the pre 2001 Taliban ever took).

7. Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan second president, who was a victim of Karzai’s fraud in the 2009 presidential elections and willingly took office–twice–thanks to massive electoral fraud. Ashraf is perosnally honest but when you come into office thanks to a stolen election, it is hard to crack down on the corrupt power brokers who got you there.

8. The US and UN architects of Afghanistan’s highly centralized constitution that was utterly inappropriate for a country that is as ethnically and geographically diverse as Afghanistan. Not only did the Constitution concentrate all power in Kabul at the expense of the provinces and districts but it also gave all power within Kabul to a Pashtun president as opposed to sharing power with an ethnically diverse parliament.

The rapid collapse follows a surrender agreement negotiated by Donald Trump and implemented by the Biden Administration. There is no reason to think the outcome would be any different if the US took another ten years to withdraw.