Memo Minutia
Warning: Extreme parsing of arcane Rovegate evidence follows. Read at the risk of being put to sleep immediately.
Michael at Reading A1 suggests that I’ve misinterpreted the Fred Barnes piece I wrote about yesterday and that Cheney may have seen an earlier memo from an American diplomat rather than the now infamous June 10, 2003 classified memo that everybody’s talking about. He may very well be right. I even questioned whether there even were any earlier memos.
Well, there were, and a whole bunch of them. (See the SSCI Report on Pre-War Intelligence, here.) And there was an American diplomat who debriefed Wilson whose report Cheney very likely saw if he requested information about Wilson’s trip — Barbara Owens-Kirkpatrick, the Ambassador of Niger. It’s entirely believable that if the VP wanted to see a report on someone they’d send him the report of an Ambassador. He may have even picked up the phone and called her. In any case, it’s certainly true that Cheney could have seen earlier memos and probably did. (We don’t know when he saw those memos, but they do exist.) My speculation was probably off base.
Michael sets forth a theory about Cheney’s revenge that I find quite persuasive. Along with him and Josh Marshall I would not be in the least bit surprised that this whole thing stemmed from the turf wars that characterized the run up to the invasion. I’m sure they are still fighting them. Negroponte may have to find some of his old friends in the Honduran Army to quell them.
Yesterday, like me, Marshall asked who wrote the June memo and why:
Who requested that the memo be written? Who actually wrote it? Why does it contain the inaccuracies the CIA claims it does? Who were the administration officials who continued to circulate the classified document to conservative news outlets even after Plame’s identity was initially revealed? And how did it get into the hands of Jeff Gannon?
I think I have discovered some answers:
The answer to the first question is that we don’t know who requested the memo.
The answer to the second question appears to be an INR analyst who is quoted heavily in the SSCI report and seems to be the only real source for the fact that Plame somehow finagled to get Wilson the trip.
In answer to the third, there is a big question as to whether anybody in the administration continued to circulate the memo to conservative news outlets (although they were certainly discussing it with mainstream news outlets.) Rather it appears that the CIA got the impression Jeff Gannon of Talon News had seen the memo (and rightly so, he acted as if he did) when he had in fact seen this article from October of 2003 in the WSJ (sorry can’t find working link) which said:
An internal government memo addresses some of the mysteries at the center of the White House leak investigation and could help investigators in the search for who disclosed the identity of a Central Intelligence Agency operative, according to two people familiar with the memo.
The memo, prepared by U.S. intelligence personnel, details a meeting in early 2002 where CIA officer Valerie Plame and other intelligence officials gathered to brainstorm about how to verify reports that Iraq had sought uranium yellowcake from Niger.
Ms. Plame, a member of the agency’s clandestine service working on Iraqi weapons issues, suggested at the meeting that her husband, Africa expert and former U.S. diplomat Joseph Wilson, could be sent to Niger to investigate the reports, according to current and former government officials familiar with the meeting at the CIA’s Virginia headquarters. Soon after, midlevel CIA officials decided to send him, say intelligence officials.
Classified memos, like the one describing Ms. Plame’s role, have limited circulation and investigators are likely to question all those known to have received it. Intelligence officials haven’t denied Ms. Plame was involved in the decision to send Mr. Wilson, but they have said she was not “responsible” for the decision.
Gannon played games for quite a while pretending he was protecting sources and the like but finally he admitted that he was actually referring to the WSJ story. (The CIA was misled by Jeff Gannon into thinking that this classified memo was making the rounds of conservative male prostitutes. You can understand why they were upset. Might as well plaster it all over the Web. In living color.)
They were also likely upset that this memo was being discussed (and in such detail) because it was still classified. (I’ll leave it up to the lawyers to figure out whether releasing new details of a classified document that has been preivously leaked contitutes a crime.)
In the end, it appears to me that there is only one primary source of the “Wilson’s wife sent him” story and it is a single INR (state department intelligence) analyst. I suspect he is the one who wrote the 2003 memo. The SSCI Report entry on this specific subject begins:
CPD officials could not recall how the office decided to contact the former ambassador, however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador’s wife “offered up his name” and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12,2002, from the former ambassador’s wife says, “my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activitv.” This was just one day before CPD sent a cable-requesting concurrence with CPD’s idea to send the former ambassador to Niger and requesting any additional information from the foreign government service on their uranium reports. The former ambassador’s wife told Committee staff that when CPD decided it would like to send the former ambassador to Niger, she approached her husband on behalf of the CIA and told him “there’s this crazy report” on a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq.
(This allegedly unbiased SSCI report is big on the scare quotes when describing the Wilsons’s testimony.It tries to make a not very subtle case that she was trying to slant the evidence to favor Saddam even before the trip. It’s this biased language to which the Democrats on the panel rightly objected in their dissent.)
The Plame memo in question here has been explained as one written about Wilson’s qualifications, but not one that suggested he go. The interviews mentioned indicate only two people, the person who said “she offered up his name” and the INR analyst who said the first meeting with Wilson was “apparently convened by [the former ambassador’s] wife who had the idea to dispatch [him.]” There appears to be no other corroboration although the meeting was full of people. The only other documentation the SSCI report provides is the INR analyst’s notes:
On February 19,2002, CPD hosted a meeting with the former ambassador, intelligence analysts from both the CIA and INR, and several individuals DO and CPD divisions. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the merits of the former ambassador traveling to Niger. An INR analyst’s notes indicate that the meeting was “apparently convened by [the former ambassador’s] wife who had the idea to dispatch [him] to use his contacts to sort out the Iraq-Niger uranium issue.” The former ambassador’s wife told Committee staff that she only attended the meeting to introduce her husband and left after about three minutes.
The CIA has disputed in press reports that this analyst could have been at the meeting in which sending Wilson was broached. And that meeting must have been before the one the analyst refers to, since Wilson attended the one he’s discussing. I don’t know if the analyst had attended any earlier meetings in which Wilson was discussed for the mission, but the report doesn’t mention it if he did. I think the press has been confused about this or deliberately misled.
What appears to have happened is that there was an earlier meeting in which it was decided (we don’t know how) that Wilson should be sent. Plame introduced her husband at a later meeting with a bunch of people from throughout the intelligence community and then left. The analyst’s impression was that she arranged the meeting and he put that in his notes. The rest is history.
Here’s the bottom line as I see it. It’s still quite possible that Cheney saw Wilson’s report. According to the SSCI report, the CIA issued one and sent it up the line specifically because they knew that Cheney had asked about the Niger question. They did not make a special delivery to his office, so there is no way to prove one way or the other if Cheney ever saw it short of subpoenaeing the VP’s records — which I’m sure have long since been “misplaced.” There were other reports issued as well, including the one written by this INR analyst called Niger: Sale of Uranium To Iraq Is Unlikely.
On the other hand, it’s entirely possible that Cheney didn’t see any reports. It’s clear that people were trying to give him information he wanted to see. Wilson’s report backed up Owen-Kirkpatrick and others who said Iraq was very unlikely to have been trying to buy yellowcake from Niger. Therefore, since it wasn’t dispositive in their view on that fact, they may not have wanted to draw Cheney’s ire by bringing it up.
One thing that’s intriguing, however, is that the CIA told Cheney’s briefer on March 5th that a source was coming back from Niger that day who could shed further light on the subject. That source was Joe Wilson. Either the briefer never gave Cheney that heads up or Cheney never followed up with it. Then again, maybe he did.
Whatever the case, Cheney says that he didn’t know anything about it until he started to read the anonymous quotes in the newspapers from “a former ambassador” at which point he got a debriefing from an American diplomat. At this same time a memo was requested by somebody about the provenance of Wilson’s trip (Wilson was saying it was to answer questions raised by Cheney.) It appears to me that at this point the INR analyst wrote up his notes about his involvement in the trip and those notes became the June 10th memo. And the White House seized on the fact that he said Wilson’s wife was involved.
I suspect that’s as far as they got. With the modern Republicans, all you have to do is mention that there might be some dirt on somebody’s wife and they are all over it like slavering wolves. This would be exactly the kind of smear they’d jump on. This, then, would be their counterattack.
If that’s so, the question then becomes, did they ever follow up with anyone to find out Plame’s status with the CIA? Did anyone ever even contemplate that she might be in a delicate position there? Did they ever ask anyone at CIA if it was true that she had “arranged” the trip? And then of course there are the pivotal questions of who saw this memo and when — and who leaked it to whom and when.
That’s my theory of how the June 2003 memo came to be. And I’m pretty convinced that it’s the real source of this whole thing. Judy Miller may complicate this, but I suspect that if she’s a source, she’s a cut-out for Libby (to whom we know she spoke during this period) not an original source herself. However, since I know fuck-all about what she knows, I can’t really speculate.
Given what we know today from news reports and the SSCI report, this single INR analyst’s notes, which people have conflated with a meeting he may never even have attended, seems like the simplest most believable source of this mess.
Update: Clarification on the Plame memo in which she discusses her husbands qualifications. TIME magazine says today:
Or, more personally, was Rove suggesting that Wilson was chosen not for his expertise but because his wife was trying to help him stay in the game? Certainly Rove distorted her role when he claimed she had authorized the trip. “She was not in a position to send Joe Wilson anywhere except to bed without his supper,” says Larry Johnson, a Plame classmate at the CIA who later worked on Central American issues for the agency and then moved to the State Department as a counterterrorism officer. According to a declassified July 7, 2004, report from the Senate Intelligence Committee, it was Plame’s boss, the deputy chief of the CIA’s counterproliferation division, who authorized the trip. He did so after Plame “offered up” her husband’s name for the Niger mission, according to the report. In a Feb. 12, 2002, memo to her boss, Plame wrote that “my husband has good relations with both the PM [Prime Minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.”
It’s highly unlikely that her boss was involved in the classified state department memo that made the rounds because well … he actually knew she was clandestine.
If he was consulted by the White House on this matter, and told them (as I assume he would) that she was undercover, then they are criminal scumbags for outing her. If they didn’t bother to consult they are stupid scumbags for outing her. Either way, they’re scumbags.
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