Time To Put On Your Game Face
I enjoy backseat campaign managing as much as the next person. And I admit that the press and our inability to manage it profoundly depresses me. But, I NEVER say we are going to lose. I love to analyze the race and offer my ideas, but it is never done in the spirit that the Kerry campaign are a bunch of losers. I cannot conceive of a more demoralizing and hopeless thing to read than something like this:
Some prominent Democrats are already grumbling privately that none of the people in Kerry’s communications operation should ever work on campaigns again, should Kerry lose. Given all the money Kerry, the DNC, and the 527s have raised and spent this time around, the typical Democratic lament of having been vastly outspent will ring hollow. If Kerry loses, it will not be because he was outspent; he will be because he was outfoxed.
There was a moment in the 1992 campaign, former Clinton-Gore ’92 communications director George Stephanopoulos told Frontline in 2001, where the staffers could suddenly feel the weight of what it was they were trying to do. Stephanopoulous talked about it in the context of the history of the War Room, and it’s quite illuminating:
Frontline: After the primaries in California, you then set up the war room. What are you trying to do?
Stephanopoulous: Not to be the Dukakis campaign, which a lot of us had worked in. And a lot of us felt we had been beat because the Republicans had laid out a pretty targeted, fierce assault on Dukakis that we didn’t answer. We were determined that if we were going to lose, we were going to lose fighting. We were going down fighting. In June, we were in third place, broke and we hadn’t gotten paid in two months. And Ross Perot was moving. And like I said, we were not going to go down without a fight.
And the war room was important, not just for the actual work it would do in answering the Republican charges and counterattacking, but the very idea of it was important — just having a war room so that Democrats, especially, but also others who were just going to start to pay attention to the campaign, would see that we weren’t like Democrats in the past. They’d see that we were different — not only because we were different on our ideas — but because we fight back when we’re hit.
Frontline: Later in the fall, polls were looking pretty good for you with Bush. Still, according to everything everyone had written, there’s a sense of fear that never goes away.
Stephanopoulous: It’s a different kind of fear. I remember the first time I ever really let myself believe we could win and we’re going to win. It was late September in the Washington Hilton on a Sunday morning, and Clinton was about to go give a speech in North Carolina on NAFTA. And he called me in and had his standard morning outburst on the speech and was yelling about it. And, but his heart wasn’t really in it, and I could tell. . . . And he suddenly stops yelling, looks me right in the eye and says, “You think we’re going to win, don’t you?” I said, “Yes.” And he goes, “I do, too.” And for me, that was just incredible. He was saying out loud what we all hoped for, but could never say. It would be like talking about a no-hitter in the eighth inning.
And from that moment on, inside we didn’t feel like underdogs anymore. We felt like we had this responsibility to win. And as a staffer, it was starting to get a little bit out of control, because I had never been through anything like that and nobody else had either. When you’re in a presidential campaign at its peak in the fall, all the sudden it’s not just 20 people in Little Rock sitting in a room. You’re representing a lot of people who have invested in you, and not just the money. People have just invested their hopes. The whole country is paying attention. There are millions. And we start to think, my God, if we blow it now, it’s all our fault. And we will have blown this opportunity that a lot of people are counting on us to carry out.
So the fear of making a mistake and letting these people down and thinking, basically, that you’re going to have to leave the country becomes tremendous. You just don’t want to blow it.
You have to wonder if the Kerry team is feeling that same fear right now, though, as they approach late September trailing rather than confident of victory. Because if they blow this one…
In late September of ’92 people were beginning to beg Perot to get back in the race and nobody knew what was going to happen. There was no empirical reason to believe that Clinton had it in the bag although I’m not surprised that he felt confident. That’s how competitors make themselves get up in the morning. That race was like a fucking bungee jump. And believe me, if you’d asked the same crew of sad sack Democratic insiders what they thought at the time they would have said that the sky was falling and that we were doomed, doomed, doomed and should have nominated Tsongas because he didn’t have a draft problem.
I’m as fond of Clinton hagiography as anyone on the planet, but a whole lot of this fuzzy nostalgia about ’92 is just crap. Bush senior was in free fall in the polls because he was widely considered to be out of touch on the economy, which was perceived to be very bad. Ross Perot had sucked all the oxygen out of the campaign for months and took the press’s eye off of the Bush assault on Clinton. Then he dramatically withdrew from the race during the Democratic convention saying that the Democratic party was “revitalized.” That was quite a gift and it gave Clinton a chance to re-start what had been a very anemic campaign.
He fought back, yes, by using the innovation of answering charges within the same news cycle. But, I watched that campaign more closely than any in my life and I can tell you that each one of those hits took another piece off of his hide. He didn’t lie down, and that was admirable, but that’s not why he won. He won because both he and Perot were hitting Senior hard on the economy while Senior and his crew were having to discredit both Perot and Clinton with character smears. Perot imploded, but by the time he did he had helped drive Senior’s negatives even farther into the dirt than Clinton’s and maintained a “movement” that siphoned off 20% of the vote when he got back in. It was one of the weirdest campaigns in American history and virtually no lessons can be drawn from it.
Kerry has every reason to be hopeful. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that Bush’s ephemeral lead is shrinking as we speak. It’s a nailbiter, but it is far from over.
I just wish that Dems could put on their game faces and try to sell the guy a little bit instead of constantly writing his epitaph. He’s really a good man, you know. He’s spent his life in public service, trying to do the right thing, working hard and carrying our agenda. He’s our most liberal nominee in decades. He’s smart and energetic and he’s never been tainted by corruption or scandal. Is it so hard for Democrats to get behind a man like this or are we just as shallow as everybody else? Would we too be happier with a brand name in a suit?