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Dumbshit Theory

I think that Charles Dodgson and some of my readers may misunderstand one of the fundamentals about the Dumbshit Theory, as Jesse at Pandagon calls it.

When it is theorized that Saddam was bluffing about whether or not he had WMD before the war it is predicated on the fact that he played many games prior to 1998 and then refused, until 2002, to allow inspectors back in after they were withdrawn. He did not have any credibility and indeed the international community had absolutely no obligation to take his word for anything.

I’m sure he didn’t approve of David Kay and I’m sure he had good reason to doubt the Americans. And, of course we were spying. But as a leader who had been found to have lied extensively about his weapons programs in the past and had (with or without the tacit approval of the US) violated international law and invaded a sovereign country just a few years before, Saddam did not have much of a leg to stand on by complaining.

The facts are that Saddam had once had an active unconventional weapons program and nobody trusted that he wouldn’t start one up again if he got the chance.

In 1998 he basically pulled the plug on inspections. No, he didn’t kick the inspectors out, but he did restrict their movement to such an extent that it was tantamount to saying, “make me.” The Clinton administration withdrew the inspectors and launched Desert Fox.

Since that time, Saddam refused to allow the UN inspectors back in. The Dumbshit Theory assumes that Saddam made the calculation around 1998 that it was in his best interest to keep the world guessing about whether he was attempting to rebuild his weapons programs. (And, I thought he might have done it as much for internal reasons as any other. Tyants don’t keep power if they allow themselves to look weak.)

By the time he agreed to give them unfettered access in 2002, under tremendous pressure, the Bush administration had already made the decision to invade.

None of this says that we had a right to go to war. The UN, with resolution 1441, was unanimous in its requirement that Iraq cooperate with inspections and it did. There is no doubt that we could and should have allowed the inspectors to complete their work while Saddam was on the hot seat and the whole world was watching.

Neither was there any reason that we had to call this bluff immediately after 9/11. The intelligence estimates, as we now know, did not anticipate that even if he was rebuilding his arsenal that he could accomplish it any time soon.

Here’s how the case is made, quite inadvertently, by a member of the Bush administration in a March article by Nicolas Lehman in the New Yorker:

Last week, I went to see Richard Haass, the director of the policy-planning staff at the State Department. Haass is probably the Administration’s most prominent moderate theoretician and is a leading member of the foreign-policy establishment …With his departure, it’s hard to think of whom one could call a prominent moderate theoretician in the Bush Administration.

[…]

After months of official talk about removing Saddam from power, would the United States really have been willing to accept his remaining as the Iraqi head of state if he complied with the weapons inspectors?

“That’s a hypothetical,” Haass said. “We said that we would have lived with it. My hunch is that, if you had had complete Iraqi co?peration and compliance, so we had eliminated to our satisfaction the W.M.D.”—weapons of mass destruction—“threat, the question would be, Could Saddam Hussein have survived that?

My hunch is, Saddam concluded he couldn’t survive it, which is one of the reasons why we are where we are. It would have been such a loss of face. But, assuming it did not lead to regime change from within, I do not think we could or would have launched a war in those circumstances.

Instead, if Saddam survived W.M.D. disarmament, we could have pursued regime change through other tools. That’s why you have diplomacy, that’s why you have propaganda, that’s why you have covert operations, that’s why you have sanctions. You have the rest of the tools. So my recommendations would have been, we pursue regime change and war-crimes prosecution—he still should have been responsible for war crimes—using other tools. But I think you had to reserve the military either for the W.M.D. issue or for incontrovertible evidence of support for terrorism.”

Oops.

The issue is not that Saddam was much too smart to ever try to bluff the US, or that he was a fine upstanding member of the international community who had been truthful about his weapons programs and should have been believed. Neither of those things are true.

The fact is that whether or not Saddam was bluffing has absolutely nothing to do with whether we needed to depose him and occupy Iraq. As the leader of the world (and now purveyors of the Pax Americana) we are supposed to be able to figure that shit out. If we can’t then we don’t have any business taking it upon ourselves to be unilaterally establishing “global order” in the first place.

The problem is that either the intelligence agencies of most powerful nation on earth were so inept that they were unable to independently verify whether he did or did not have WMD or that the most powerful nation on earth knew very well that Saddam did not possess WMD and lied about it.

In either case it completely invalidates the central tenet of the Bush Doctrine — the concept of “pre-emption.” The US has just proved that it cannot be trusted to launch wars of choice based upon its knowledge that a given country will present a threat in the future.

The Democratic Revolution

Calpundit says:

After all, the real purpose of the war, we’re told, was to turn Iraq into a model for other Middle Eastern states to follow. I think this explanation is essentially correct, and what’s more, I agree that it’s the only real justification the war had.

But, he then wonders why they didn’t do sufficient planning for the post-war period.

I think that things like this happen for a variety of reasons, some of which Kevin mentions — like the fact that certain people believed the nonsense that Iraqis would be so grateful that they would show up for work on Monday and everything would fall into place.

And, in fact there was some planning, but they planned for all the wrong things — like a massive refugee crisis that never materialized. (Competence and prescience are not the strong suit of the ivory tower neoconservatives.)

But, the main reason they didn’t plan better is because this so-called real purpose for the war is no more the actual purpose than WMD or ties to terrorism. It is a happy talking point designed to lull good hearted Americans into believing that we are on a grand humanitarian mission. (In fact, its main purpose may have been to gain the support of George W. Bush.)

The reality is that the invasion of Iraq is nothing more than a cold and straightforward demonstration of American military power for the purpose of intimidating enemies and to enable a long term strategic placement of troops and equipment in the region.

This is made quite clear in the PNAC’s defense strategy document that pre-dated 9/11 and formed the basis for the Bush Doctrine:

“Facing up to the realities of multiple constabulary missions that will require a permanent allocation of U.S.forces.”

“Need for a larger U.S. security perimeter” and the U.S. “should seek to establish a network of ‘deployment bases’ or ‘forward operating bases’ to increase the reach of current and future forces.”

“North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or similar states [will not be allowed] to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies, or threaten the American homeland itself.”

“Main military missions” necessary to “preserve Pax Americana” and a “unipolar 21st century” are the following: “secure and expand zones of democratic peace, deter rise of new great-power competitor, defend key regions (Europe, East Asia, Middle East), and exploit transformation of war.”

The PNAC report concludes that the global order “must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.”

As for Iraq, it explicitly says:

“The U.S. has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in the Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.”

It also mentions “Saudi domestic sensibilities,” and calls for a permanent Gulf military presence even “should Saddam pass from the scene” because “Iran may well prove as large a threat.”

It was only after Powell briefly prevailed in keeping the neocons on their leash after 9/11 that the neocons fell back on their pal Michael Ledeen’s old bogus arguments from the 80’s about exporting a “democratic revolution.”

After others like Michael Kelly rolled out the new talking points in the summer of 2002, Ledeen himself opined in the Wall Street Journal:

If we come to Baghdad, Damascus and Tehran as liberators, we can expect overwhelming popular support. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it well the other day when he encouraged his media questioners to think about the people in such places as prisoners, not as free men and women. They will join us if they believe we are serious, and they will only believe we are serious when they see us winning. Our first move must therefore show both our power and our liberating intent.

It pays to remember that in 1985 he also wrote:

”America has voiced against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan power of Central America, however, we have not acted upon it. If we fail to act, our Cuban and Nicaraguan enemies will slowly set their conflict throughout the hemisphere.”

This will only discourage others who are contemplating “taking up the struggle for democratic revolution.” Also, failure to act in Central America, will make the US lose credibility among other nations; causing other regimes not to listen to our advice. They will say, “If America cannot protect a nearby ally against Nicaragua, can it be expected to shelter a distant friend against the Soviet Union itself?”

“We should remain true to our principles—supporting the democratic revolution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, while thwarting and reversing the totalitarian advance, in order to persuade others to take risks for freedom and democracy.”

I don’t suggest that Michael Ledeen doesn’t believe what he says, although like all the neocons, he is always wrong in his predictions. I do know that he is full of really wacked out ideas, not the least of which was his recent temper tantrum suggesting that we might want to think about declaring war on France.

But, his “democratic revolution” argument was never an explicit part of the neocon argument for removing Saddam until the Spring of 2002, when the neocon faction was pressing its case for invasion.

The big strategic reason for invading and occupying Iraq has been public since Wolfowitz’s 1992 Defense Policy Guidance that formed the basis for the PNAC document and the Bush Doctrine.

Demonstrate our military prowess and willingness to use it.

Establish a permanent military presence in the region.

Prove that leaders of rogue states will not be allowed to undermine American leaders, intimidate American allies, or threaten the American homeland itself.

All the rest is up for grabs. If Iraq becomes a democracy, all to the good (unless they elect someone hostile to us.) But, the plan certainly does not require an outbreak of democracy in the mid-east for it to be perceived as successful by its planners. What matters is that we won easily and our military is established on the ground in the region for the forseeable future. That’s why we really did it.

Whether those successes bring about the expressed goal of global order based on a “secure foundation of unquestioned U.S. military preeminence” remains to be seen. It’s entirely possible that it will result in exactly the opposite. And that Americans will pay a steep price for such hubris.

Defining Moment

For the record, I’m against allowing gays to marry because I feel that it will rend the very fabric of our society by tearing asunder the traditional definition of the institution at the heart of it. Indeed, we have already gone too far.

In order to restore the sanctity of marriage I propose that we not only pass a constitutional amendment barring gay marriage, but that we also pass one reversing all of the other changes to the definition of marriage that conservatives predicted would be catastrophic when they were first proposed.

For instance, women were considered property of their husbands, and their property was considered the property of their husbands for millennia. It was absolutely fundamental to the definition of marriage and allowing women to be legal equals was correctly predicted to completely destroy the moral basis of the institution. Just think how much better off we would be today if people had listened to conservatives who predicted that marriage could never survive such a huge legal change instead of allowing a bunch of off the wall feminists to destroy the very foundation of society.

Obviously, birth control should immediately be outlawed. During the debate that took place during the 50’s and early 60’s on the subject it was clear to anyone who paid attention that if birth control were made legal it would sanction immorality and promiscuous lust and the institution of marriage would disappear. Clearly, that has happened. Similarly, loosening the divorce laws has led to polygamy just as conservatives and religious scholors predicted.

And, as so clearly demonstrated by recent history, allowing the races to intermarry is tantamount to sanctifying bestiality. (Conservatives knew, then as now, that man is always teetering on the edge of mad dog-love and all it will take is a change in our definition of marriage to push him over.)

Frankly, I think we should think about going back to the earliest definitions of marriage if we hope to preserve it as the basis upon which our society thrives. Therefore, I believe marriage should be defined as a man and the woman (or women) he abducts from an enemy tribe. Now, that’s a legal definition anybody can understand.

Maybe there are those who think that later societies may have made an improvement or two on the concept of what constitutes marriage. Perhaps we can concede that marriage should at least be agreed upon by the groom and the bride’s father. (Abduction can be so unpleasant.) In fact, we could go back to tradition that held for hundreds of years in Europe wherein the engagement celebration was the culmination of contract negotiations between the families and featured consummation of the marriage and the presentation of the blood stained sheet. Marriage itself was only “sanctified” later (by either a notary or a priest) when the actual money changed hands.

But, perhaps the most important tradition to many in the conservative movement will be the return of the tradition of droigt de seigneur. In the modern world this would be interpreted as the right of the CEO, landlord or male politician to sleep with any bride on her wedding night. Surely this is one marriage “tradition” that should be revived.

If we want to preserve the traditional definition of marriage, that is.

Tony’s Dilemma

Matthew Yglesias has a great post up about the assertion in the Tom Friedman column today that Blair couldn’t make the real case for invasion because of the British public’s shallow dislike for George W. Bush’s personality and because they hadn’t gone through 9/11.

I think that antipathy to the government of George W. Bush is a perfectly sound reason for doubting the humanitarian case for war that Friedman and others on the left have been pushing. The argument would, in short, be that before the war Bush had been given the opportunity to govern one country and he basically made a hash of it. We’ve seen bad budgeting, crony capitalism, social intolerance, large-scale dishonesty, and a wavering commitment to democratic procedure, liberal transparency, and all other norms of good government. Now as Friedman has repeatedly been at pains to point out, winning the peace in Iraq will be a difficult business and it seems eminently reasonable to ask whether or not the person in charge of the operation is up to the task.

I agree that questioning this particular administration’s ability to carry out such an ambitious nation building plan was always perfectly reasonable, even if you agreed with the goals on humanitarian terms. I always thought that the Iraqi people were tough enough to hold out for another couple of years until we could get someone competent in office.

But, I also think that Friedman has completely misunderstood Blair’s dilemma with respect to why he had to make the imminent threat argument. It wasn’t because the British hadn’t experienced 9/11 and therefore needed to be persuaded that they were under threat. The reason Blair had to make the phony case for terrorist ties and WMD was because Americans needed to be persuaded that 9/11 had something to do with Iraq. He knew that this opportunity to remove the tyrant only existed because Bush was willing to frighten the American public into believing that Saddam was involved and that he was planning to launch biological, chemical and nuclear weapons at the US in his next attack.

Imagine if Bush had said in his SOTU, “We were just dramatically attacked by Islamic fundamentalists who have declared holy war on our country. We removed the government that was providing them haven in Afghanistan, but many of them are still hiding there and in Pakistan and their influence continues to grow throughout the Muslim world. Kim Jong Il of North Korea told us that he has nukes and is ready to sell them to terrorists to feed his starving population. Despite these huge immediate challenges, I think this is the perfect moment, with only our good friend Great Britain by our side, to launch a completely unrelated operation to liberate the Iraqi people from the Stalinist tyrant who we have allowed to remain in power for more than 30 years. We think that if we build a democracy in Iraq that terrorists will see the error of their ways eventually.”

In the unlikely event that Americans agreed that this was a good time to begin launching humanitarian operations only very tangentially related to terrorism, he would have run right up against another argument against invading Iraq right after 9/11 which was that invading a middle eastern country immediately in the wake of 9/11 would potentially alienate many of the Arab states that had been helpful in tracking down al Qaeda and was likely to create even more resentment and be a recruiting bonanza for terrorists.

A majority of Americans might have then concluded that a long term and extremely expensive humanitarian mission in Iraq was not worth throwing away our long term alliances and the support of the entire world after 9/11 just when we needed as much global cooperation as possible to combat terrorism. Certainly, people might have at least asked for more than happy talk about “sending messages” and “setting examples” if the cost of unilateralism as measured in lives and tax dollars — much less national security — had ever been discussed.

Friedman, however, persists in his completely unsubstantiated conclusion that America and Britain invading and “building a more decent Iraq would help tilt the Middle East onto a more progressive political track and send a message to all the neighboring regimes that Western governments were not going to just sit back and let them incubate suicide bombers and religious totalitarians, whose fanaticism threatened all open societies.”

He has said this over and over again.

Can someone please explain to me why he thinks Iraq’s neighbors would learn the lesson that the invasion proved that the West was not going to let them “incubate suicide bombers and religious totalitarians whose fanaticism threaten all open societies” when Iraq featured none of those problems?!! Does he think that Arab leaders are as stupid as the Americans who bought the mawkish tripe that Saddam was behind 9/11? For Gawd’s sake…

The lesson is that America invaded an Arab country that posed no threat, and had nothing to do with 9/11 because it saw the opportunity to get away with it. As for building “a more decent Iraq,” I’d feel a little bit more confident if that hustler Ahmed Chalabi wasn’t taking over the intelligence apparatus and using it to settle old scores — with Wolfie and Rummy’s enthusiastic permission, evidently.

I admit that as a hater of totalitarians here and elsewhere, I generally agree with Blair that if we have the capability of getting rid of a tyrannical dictator with minimal loss of life and the support of the international community, that it is a worthy goal. Nobody has to make the humanitarian argument to me. But as the British people wisely understood (and you have to wonder why Blair and Friedman didn’t) the problem in this instance was that the President of the United States was an incompetent puppet, his advisors were either ineffectual milquetoasts or radical nutcases, and his timing was cynically opportunistic and counterproductive.

As Yglesias points out, there was absolutely no reason to think that they were going to be any more prudent or competent in this arena than in any other. It was obvious from the beginning that the competing factions of the foreign policy shop in this White House were engaged in a constant tug of war for the ADD-led brain of President Treadmill. The President’s own father had to have his friend Brent Scowcroft write an op-ed piece in the NY Times to persuade him to muzzle Mad Dog Cheney in the run up to the war. It didn’t take a genius to figure out that they weren’t exactly a well oiled machine over there.

I don’t know if Americans will ever face up to the fact that Bush and his cronies either didn’t give a damn about 9/11 or, even more frightening, actually believe that Saddam was behind it. But, Tom Friedman should know better.

The Crazy Aunt (and Uncle) of Iraq Policy

Oh, this is rich. I just noticed that Atrios linked to a post at Abu Aardvaark regarding my very favorite lil’ wacky neocon, Laurie Mylroie:

…Incredibly, Wolfowitz told NBC’s Tim Russert that he didn’t know who was responsible for the Cole and Khobar Tower attacks. But on that question, the agreement is all but unanimous: It wasn’t Saddam, it wasn’t Iraq. It was Osama and al-Qaida.”

What is Wolfowitz talking about? Boehlert doesn’t speculate, but I’m happy to. I would never presume to know the mind of the Wolfowitz, but I have a pretty good idea what is going on here: Wolfowitz is loyal to his friend Laurie Mylroie. Mylroie, for those who haven’t come across her before, has long been kind of the “crazy aunt” of Iraq policy. Obsessed with the idea that Saddam Hussein was behind most of the world’s evil, Mylroie has spun an astonishing web in a series of articles and a very odd book to “prove” that Iraq was behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing – as well as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (you may have thought it was Timothy McVeigh, but hello – pay attention, okay?), the 1997 Luxor attacks in Egypt, the Cole bombing, the anthrax attacks, and the cancelation of Firefly (well, maybe not that last one, but he probably *wanted* Firefly canceled).

In her brand new book, “Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror” (yes, you read that title right), Mylroie goes even farther, entering into tinfoil hat-country. According to Mylroie, Iraq was responsible for September 11 – not working with al-Qaeda, not coordinating with al-Qaeda, but actually responsible for it, while cleverly setting al-Qaeda and bin Laden up to take the fall. Yes, Mylroie (who was invited to testify before the 9/11 commission, co-authored a book with Judith Miller, is affiliated with AEI, is good friends with Ahmad Chalabi as well as with Paul Wolfowitz) denies bin Laden’s responsibility for 9/11… (p.51)

Go read the whole post because not only is it informative, it is also funny.

It reminded me that Wolfowitz had actually specifically endorsed some of Mylroie’s crazy rantings in the famous Vanity Fair article, but it had been overlooked in the flap over WMD and the bureaucracy.

Josh Marshall wrote at the time:

So here’s the story with the disputed quotes from Sam Tanenhaus’ article on Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in Vanity Fair. As noted here a couple days ago, the Tanenhaus article says that Wolfowitz is “confident” that Saddam played some role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and that he had “entertained” the notion that Saddam had played some role in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing as well. (Tanenhaus sources Wolfowitz’s ideas about Oklahoma City to a “longtime friend” of the Deputy Secretary.)

In the portion of his article that discusses his interview, Tanenhaus quotes Wolfowitz on the 1993 bombing and then notes that Wolfowitz declined to comment on Saddam’s possible involvement in the Oklahoma City bombing.

Now, Wolfowitz is also on record as saying that he’s unclear about Cole and Khobar Towers, which his looney friend Mylroie also claims were masterminded by the Godlike and Omnipotent Saddam Hussein.

This is some real crazy-assed thinking and when you combine it with their blind faith in the Iraqi exile hustlers, you really have to question whether we are dealing with people who are working on all cylinders.

Interestingly, when I went back to read the transcript of the vanity Fair interview (which does not contain the refences to 1993 or Oklahoma because while they claim they were off the record) I found this incredible quote from Wolfowitz:

The mistake that Saddam made was in assuming that we would behave in a certain way, i.e. we would never go to war until we’d had six weeks of bombing first. That’s a sort of classic intelligence failure, to have a certain expectation and then see all the evidence in light of that expectation.

Yup. Uh huh. He said it.

Bluff Stuff

Via Josh Marshall I see that a former high level Iraqi officialsays that Saddam destroyed his weapons but wanted the world to be unsure as to whether he had WMD, as a deterrent.

I said this back in June, in response to all these questions asking “why didn’t he fully cooperate?”

Saddam was a strongman dictator who maintained his power, both within the country and in the region, through fear and violence. Kowtowing to the UN and especially to the US would have substantially weakened his reputation as a ruthless tyrant who was willing to do anything to stay in power. If a totalitarian shows weakness, the whole house of cards can come tumbling down. It’s possible that he felt he had to bluff or lose his grip on power from within.

And perhaps he simply made the logical calculation that, as the North Korea situation has shown, the US will not unilaterally invade a nuclear power and will hesitate to put large numbers of troops in the way of lethal unconventional weapons. Anyone in his shoes might have felt it was in his best interests to keep the world guessing about his WMD capabilities and willingness to use them. When it became clear last fall that the US was going to call his bluff, it appears to me that instead of preparing a traditional defense and going down in a blaze of glory, he made plans to go underground or escape (and perhaps live to fight another day.) I doubt very seriously that even crazy Saddam ever entertained the illusion that his army could defeat the US military in a straight up fight. Once that was inevitable, he went to plan B. Plan A was to keep the world guessing as long as he could about what he was really capable of.

I recently read that he thought his troops would fight an urban guerilla war in Baghdad and they didn’t, so the “live to fight another day” theory may be wrong. Nonetheless, I still think it is completely reasonable that Saddam didn’t have the weapons but believed it served his purposes to keep the world guessing and this account gives it some credence.

The big question, however, is whether it is reasonable to believe that the most powerful country in the world bought this 3rd rate dictator’s gamesmanship and if they did, whether it is reasonable that we have a doctrine of preventive war if our top flight, super sophisticated intelligence services are so easily duped.

If the clumsy posturing of a not-too-bright tyrant is now the only evidence we need to launch an invasion then we are in for a very bumpy ride. (And, I would like to propose that we simply start flushing thousand dollar bills down the toilet rather than continue to fund a defense and intelligence apparatus that is incapable of verifying whether or not these claims have any basis in reality.)

In truth, the hyping of the evidence speaks for itself. (And I still think it is thoroughly illogical that the US would have put tens of thousands of troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border in a long term build last winter if we truly believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.)

If Saddam bluffed and we knew he was bluffing (or certainly should have known) then somebody needs to ask what purpose was served for the people of the United States and Britain for their governments to call that bluff.

The Phony

I think this article in Salon is exactly right. It’s certainly a description of Commander Codpiece that’s come up over and over again in conversations I’ve had with Democrats.

Rep. Dick Gephardt made his best and perhaps his only significant contribution to defeating George Bush in 2004 last month, when he derided the president’s “bring ’em on” challenge to Iraqi attacks on American forces. “Enough of the phony macho rhetoric,” Gephardt shot back. The Missouri Democrat’s line was more than just padded flight-suit envy. His jibe hints at the strategy that could put a Democrat back in the White House: convincing Americans that Bush is a phony.

The Democrats can only win if they succeed in undermining the president’s greatest strength: his credibility as a decisive and authentic wartime leader. The problem is that in such uncertain times many Americans instinctively can’t and don’t want to believe that George Bush is screwing them. Until the Democrats change how voters view Bush the man, and then link that to a broader critique of his administration, the Democrats will have a hard time punching through.

[…]

The core problem with the current Democratic strategy is that a piecemeal, issue-by-issue attack on the policies of the administration will not resonate while Bush retains the esteem and even admiration of many ordinary Americans. And a contest based on issues will only get harder as Bush moves from shoring up his base to moderating his image in the lead-up to next fall. Expect the policy lines to blur amid a renewed focus on domestic issues and a revival of the language and imagery of compassionate conservatism.

The Democrats’ greatest danger is to run an issues-based campaign that becomes a ritualized liberal/conservative slanging match. Progressives who are flabbergasted at the audacity of Bush’s agenda seem to think that simply communicating Bush’s policy failures is enough. But this approach will play straight into Karl Rove’s chubby hands and trap Democrats in the defensive, dithering posture that has defined them since the Bush presidency began.

So no matter how bad Bush’s actual record may be, Democrats simply can’t count on fighting the upcoming election on substantive policy grounds alone.

This is an ongoing problem for Democrats. We are earnest and sincere but every time we open our mouths it’s about our 10 point “program” and why is it better. Even my eyes glaze over.

We’d better figure out how to take this personality driven politics to the Republicans.

Besides, Bush IS a phony— he’s a phony Texan, a phony businessman, a phony politician, a phony flyboy, a phony compassionate conservative, and a phony regular guy. He’s actually a phony president. Nobody believes, deep down, that he’s calling the shots.

The only thing authentic about him is his nasty temper and loyalty to big business.

Do We Sense A Pattern?

The CIA objected to claims in the British government’s September dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons programme, the issue at the heart of the Kelly affair, it was revealed yesterday.

It appears that among the CIA’s objections was the much-trumpeted claim that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

[…]

Yesterday, the FO revealed that the CIA was given a draft of the government’s dossier on September 11 last year, the same day Alastair Campbell, the prime minister’s communications director, saw it, according to evidence given to the Commons committee.

The committee asked the FO what “reservations and comments” the CIA had expressed about the September dossier in addition to the Niger uranium story. The FO replied: “The CIA made a number of comments”. It declined to be specific but added: “The JIC chairman incorporated or rejected them as he judged fit.”

How, then, do we explain this, from Dana Milbank’s piece in the W. Post from July 20th?

The claim, which has since been discredited, was made twice by President Bush, in a September Rose Garden appearance after meeting with lawmakers and in a Saturday radio address the same week. Bush attributed the claim to the British government, but in a “Global Message” issued Sept. 26 and still on the White House Web site, the White House claimed, without attribution, that Iraq “could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given.”

[…]

The White House embraced the claim, from a British dossier on Iraq, at the same time it began to promote the dossier’s disputed claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa.

Bush administration officials last week said the CIA was not consulted about the claim. A senior White House official did not dispute that account, saying presidential remarks such as radio addresses are typically “circulated at the staff level” within the White House only.

But, the CIA was consulted and told the British government that it was false. Unfortunately, they apparently forgot to tell the White House because two weeks later the president made the claim in a Rose Garden appearance on September 26th, and in his radio address two days later.

Lucky for him, he was very careful, just as with the uranium issue, to attribute it to the British government so nobody can say he was technically lying. Whew!

Maybe it’s just me, but I think it’s quite amazing that they made more than one wild claim based upon British intelligence that it later turned out our CIA had already rejected. What are the odds of that happening?

At the very least you’d think that since they knew that elements of the dossier were “dodgy” at least since September 28th (or they would have continued to use the “sexy” 45 minute claim) they’d be extra careful about repeating other claims from that document without making sure the CIA had no objections.

Yet, even with memos flying from the CIA director about the African uranium claim, the NSC didn’t put 2 and 2 together and conclude that maybe — just like the “sexed up” 45 minute fantasy that they were forced to give up back in September — it might be prudent to stop repeating it.

Talk about bad luck.

It would be very interesting to find out what other claims in the “dodgy dossier” the CIA objected to back in September 2002.

The Rule of Law Cast Adrift

Kofi Annan asks the right questions:

Suggesting that some world leaders at the coming General Assembly should set aside time for basic discussions on these issues, he said, “if we are going to make preventive action, or war, part of our response to these new threats, what are the rules?”

“Who decides?” he added. “Under what circumstances? Did what happened in Iraq constitute an exception? A precedent others can exploit? What are the rules?”

In effect, three months after President Bush warned that the United Nations might become irrelevant, the secretary general turned a traditional midsummer news conference into a stump speech on the value of international institutions in general and the United Nations in particular.

At one point, recalling the bitter dismissals of the United Nations last winter, he said, with a bare hint of satisfaction, “I did warn those who were bashing the U.N. that they had to be careful because they may need the U.N. soon.”

The answer to Annan’s questions are obvious and should be shared with the American citizenry. They are akin to language in the Bush vs Gore decision.

The doctrine of preventive war is limited to circumstances that George W. Bush sets forth, for the problem of allowing other nations to use the same rationale generally presents many complexities.

Bush decides, under whatever circumstances he wants. Iraq is not an exception, others may NOT exploit the precedent and the rules are what we say they are.

I don’t think that most people are comfortable with the idea that the US isn’t playing by any agreed upon rules. We like to see ourselves as good citizens and responsible world leaders. I doubt that many have any clue that the Bush administration has caused an international crisis with its unilateral foreign policy that observes no discernible rule of law.

And, I do not believe that Americans want to bear the cost of Bush’s military adventurism all alone, whether they favor any particular war or not. The Democrats need to make the case for multi-lateralism by hammering the fact that Bush’s go-it-alone stubbornness means that we pay the entire cost ourselves, in lives as well as money — not to mention the less quantifiable costs in credibility, cooperation and prestige.

Blinded By Faith

Today, one of my favorite blogs,TAPPED says:

One gets the sense that, rather than Bush administration officials regarding the war on terrorism as something new under the sun — something that might require them to think and act differently and rearrange their priorities — they regarded it as an excuse to do everything they had already wanted to do.

This is a very important point. During the 2003 run-up to the invasion (and even before, on Eschaton) I wrote about the intellectual inflexibility of the neconservative claque. From January 5th:

It is true that Iraq could get nukes and Saddam could extort the entire western world by withholding oil and driving up the price. So could other countries, for that matter. No matter who managed to do this, it would not be a pretty picture. But, even Kenneth Pollack, who is held up as the authority on the necessity of invading Iraq, argues that while Saddam will have to be deposed, it is not so immediate a threat that we could not wait long enough to mitigate some of the potentially dangerous repercussions and plan for our long term responsibilities in the region before taking action.

Confronting Saddam could have waited because what is not waiting is the simmering anti-American bloodlust that is sweeping the Middle East, particularly in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Invading Iraq on a thin pretext (which is what is going to happen because this war is already timed for American convenience and nothing else) is possibly going to set off a chain of events that could have been avoided if we handled the situation with a little more sophistication and finesse instead of fulfilling some long held neocon wet dream. And that is the real problem.

The Wolfowitz/Perle school never took terrorism seriously when it was becoming a threat on the world stage and they don’t take it seriously now. The influential CSP issued only 2 reports since the 1998 embassy bombing about the threat of terrorism until 9/11. The PNAC has been wringing their hands about Iraq and pushing for missile defense for years, but terrorism was hardly even on the radar screen. They are about China, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, Israel, US “benevolent” hegemony and missile defense. Period. Anything else will be subsumed under what they believe is the real agenda.

As with the ever changing justifications for the tax cuts for their rich friends, Bush and his foreign policy mavens are so blinkered and myopic and that they pursue their preordained agenda no matter what the current situation. They seem completely incapable of exercising any flexibility in light of changing circumstances. They just find a way to use the changing circumstances to justify what they plan to do anyway.

This is very dangerous. Bush, with his stupid bellicose posturing has created a needless crisis in Asia by challenging a cornered and neurotically proud despot in North Korea into a nuclear standoff. He has escalated the problem with Iraq to one of immediate danger, when it was a medium term threat at worst, and by conflating it with Al Qaeda and Muslim fundamentalism, for no good reason other than political expediency, he has made it a cause for a whole lot of disaffected people in the Mideast and Indian subcontinent to rally to.

It goes on to discuss how much this all has to do with their childlike devotion to the fantasy of missile defense.

It should be clear by now, with all we know about the bogus justifications for invading and occupying Iraq, that the Bush administration does not care about terrorism and is wedded to grandiose unilateralist ideas that were formulated during the cold war and desperately need to be re-evaluated.

This should be the basis for the Democratic critique of Bush’s foreign policy. The world is changing. The neocons refuse to see it.