Via Josh Marshall I see that a former high level Iraqi officialsays that Saddam destroyed his weapons but wanted the world to be unsure as to whether he had WMD, as a deterrent.
I said this back in June, in response to all these questions asking “why didn’t he fully cooperate?”
Saddam was a strongman dictator who maintained his power, both within the country and in the region, through fear and violence. Kowtowing to the UN and especially to the US would have substantially weakened his reputation as a ruthless tyrant who was willing to do anything to stay in power. If a totalitarian shows weakness, the whole house of cards can come tumbling down. It’s possible that he felt he had to bluff or lose his grip on power from within.
And perhaps he simply made the logical calculation that, as the North Korea situation has shown, the US will not unilaterally invade a nuclear power and will hesitate to put large numbers of troops in the way of lethal unconventional weapons. Anyone in his shoes might have felt it was in his best interests to keep the world guessing about his WMD capabilities and willingness to use them. When it became clear last fall that the US was going to call his bluff, it appears to me that instead of preparing a traditional defense and going down in a blaze of glory, he made plans to go underground or escape (and perhaps live to fight another day.) I doubt very seriously that even crazy Saddam ever entertained the illusion that his army could defeat the US military in a straight up fight. Once that was inevitable, he went to plan B. Plan A was to keep the world guessing as long as he could about what he was really capable of.
I recently read that he thought his troops would fight an urban guerilla war in Baghdad and they didn’t, so the “live to fight another day” theory may be wrong. Nonetheless, I still think it is completely reasonable that Saddam didn’t have the weapons but believed it served his purposes to keep the world guessing and this account gives it some credence.
The big question, however, is whether it is reasonable to believe that the most powerful country in the world bought this 3rd rate dictator’s gamesmanship and if they did, whether it is reasonable that we have a doctrine of preventive war if our top flight, super sophisticated intelligence services are so easily duped.
If the clumsy posturing of a not-too-bright tyrant is now the only evidence we need to launch an invasion then we are in for a very bumpy ride. (And, I would like to propose that we simply start flushing thousand dollar bills down the toilet rather than continue to fund a defense and intelligence apparatus that is incapable of verifying whether or not these claims have any basis in reality.)
In truth, the hyping of the evidence speaks for itself. (And I still think it is thoroughly illogical that the US would have put tens of thousands of troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border in a long term build last winter if we truly believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.)
If Saddam bluffed and we knew he was bluffing (or certainly should have known) then somebody needs to ask what purpose was served for the people of the United States and Britain for their governments to call that bluff.
I think this article in Salon is exactly right. It’s certainly a description of Commander Codpiece that’s come up over and over again in conversations I’ve had with Democrats.
Rep. Dick Gephardt made his best and perhaps his only significant contribution to defeating George Bush in 2004 last month, when he derided the president’s “bring ’em on” challenge to Iraqi attacks on American forces. “Enough of the phony macho rhetoric,” Gephardt shot back. The Missouri Democrat’s line was more than just padded flight-suit envy. His jibe hints at the strategy that could put a Democrat back in the White House: convincing Americans that Bush is a phony.
The Democrats can only win if they succeed in undermining the president’s greatest strength: his credibility as a decisive and authentic wartime leader. The problem is that in such uncertain times many Americans instinctively can’t and don’t want to believe that George Bush is screwing them. Until the Democrats change how voters view Bush the man, and then link that to a broader critique of his administration, the Democrats will have a hard time punching through.
[…]
The core problem with the current Democratic strategy is that a piecemeal, issue-by-issue attack on the policies of the administration will not resonate while Bush retains the esteem and even admiration of many ordinary Americans. And a contest based on issues will only get harder as Bush moves from shoring up his base to moderating his image in the lead-up to next fall. Expect the policy lines to blur amid a renewed focus on domestic issues and a revival of the language and imagery of compassionate conservatism.
The Democrats’ greatest danger is to run an issues-based campaign that becomes a ritualized liberal/conservative slanging match. Progressives who are flabbergasted at the audacity of Bush’s agenda seem to think that simply communicating Bush’s policy failures is enough. But this approach will play straight into Karl Rove’s chubby hands and trap Democrats in the defensive, dithering posture that has defined them since the Bush presidency began.
So no matter how bad Bush’s actual record may be, Democrats simply can’t count on fighting the upcoming election on substantive policy grounds alone.
This is an ongoing problem for Democrats. We are earnest and sincere but every time we open our mouths it’s about our 10 point “program” and why is it better. Even my eyes glaze over.
We’d better figure out how to take this personality driven politics to the Republicans.
Besides, Bush IS a phony— he’s a phony Texan, a phony businessman, a phony politician, a phony flyboy, a phony compassionate conservative, and a phony regular guy. He’s actually a phony president. Nobody believes, deep down, that he’s calling the shots.
The only thing authentic about him is his nasty temper and loyalty to big business.
The CIA objected to claims in the British government’s September dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons programme, the issue at the heart of the Kelly affair, it was revealed yesterday.
It appears that among the CIA’s objections was the much-trumpeted claim that Iraqi forces could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.
[…]
Yesterday, the FO revealed that the CIA was given a draft of the government’s dossier on September 11 last year, the same day Alastair Campbell, the prime minister’s communications director, saw it, according to evidence given to the Commons committee.
The committee asked the FO what “reservations and comments” the CIA had expressed about the September dossier in addition to the Niger uranium story. The FO replied: “The CIA made a number of comments”. It declined to be specific but added: “The JIC chairman incorporated or rejected them as he judged fit.”
How, then, do we explain this, from Dana Milbank’s piece in the W. Post from July 20th?
The claim, which has since been discredited, was made twice by President Bush, in a September Rose Garden appearance after meeting with lawmakers and in a Saturday radio address the same week. Bush attributed the claim to the British government, but in a “Global Message” issued Sept. 26 and still on the White House Web site, the White House claimed, without attribution, that Iraq “could launch a biological or chemical attack 45 minutes after the order is given.”
[…]
The White House embraced the claim, from a British dossier on Iraq, at the same time it began to promote the dossier’s disputed claim that Iraq sought uranium in Africa.
Bush administration officials last week said the CIA was not consulted about the claim. A senior White House official did not dispute that account, saying presidential remarks such as radio addresses are typically “circulated at the staff level” within the White House only.
But, the CIA was consulted and told the British government that it was false. Unfortunately, they apparently forgot to tell the White House because two weeks later the president made the claim in a Rose Garden appearance on September 26th, and in his radio address two days later.
Lucky for him, he was very careful, just as with the uranium issue, to attribute it to the British government so nobody can say he was technically lying. Whew!
Maybe it’s just me, but I think it’s quite amazing that they made more than one wild claim based upon British intelligence that it later turned out our CIA had already rejected. What are the odds of that happening?
At the very least you’d think that since they knew that elements of the dossier were “dodgy” at least since September 28th (or they would have continued to use the “sexy” 45 minute claim) they’d be extra careful about repeating other claims from that document without making sure the CIA had no objections.
Yet, even with memos flying from the CIA director about the African uranium claim, the NSC didn’t put 2 and 2 together and conclude that maybe — just like the “sexed up” 45 minute fantasy that they were forced to give up back in September — it might be prudent to stop repeating it.
Talk about bad luck.
It would be very interesting to find out what other claims in the “dodgy dossier” the CIA objected to back in September 2002.
Suggesting that some world leaders at the coming General Assembly should set aside time for basic discussions on these issues, he said, “if we are going to make preventive action, or war, part of our response to these new threats, what are the rules?”
“Who decides?” he added. “Under what circumstances? Did what happened in Iraq constitute an exception? A precedent others can exploit? What are the rules?”
In effect, three months after President Bush warned that the United Nations might become irrelevant, the secretary general turned a traditional midsummer news conference into a stump speech on the value of international institutions in general and the United Nations in particular.
At one point, recalling the bitter dismissals of the United Nations last winter, he said, with a bare hint of satisfaction, “I did warn those who were bashing the U.N. that they had to be careful because they may need the U.N. soon.”
The answer to Annan’s questions are obvious and should be shared with the American citizenry. They are akin to language in the Bush vs Gore decision.
The doctrine of preventive war is limited to circumstances that George W. Bush sets forth, for the problem of allowing other nations to use the same rationale generally presents many complexities.
Bush decides, under whatever circumstances he wants. Iraq is not an exception, others may NOT exploit the precedent and the rules are what we say they are.
I don’t think that most people are comfortable with the idea that the US isn’t playing by any agreed upon rules. We like to see ourselves as good citizens and responsible world leaders. I doubt that many have any clue that the Bush administration has caused an international crisis with its unilateral foreign policy that observes no discernible rule of law.
And, I do not believe that Americans want to bear the cost of Bush’s military adventurism all alone, whether they favor any particular war or not. The Democrats need to make the case for multi-lateralism by hammering the fact that Bush’s go-it-alone stubbornness means that we pay the entire cost ourselves, in lives as well as money — not to mention the less quantifiable costs in credibility, cooperation and prestige.
One gets the sense that, rather than Bush administration officials regarding the war on terrorism as something new under the sun — something that might require them to think and act differently and rearrange their priorities — they regarded it as an excuse to do everything they had already wanted to do.
This is a very important point. During the 2003 run-up to the invasion (and even before, on Eschaton) I wrote about the intellectual inflexibility of the neconservative claque. From January 5th:
It is true that Iraq could get nukes and Saddam could extort the entire western world by withholding oil and driving up the price. So could other countries, for that matter. No matter who managed to do this, it would not be a pretty picture. But, even Kenneth Pollack, who is held up as the authority on the necessity of invading Iraq, argues that while Saddam will have to be deposed, it is not so immediate a threat that we could not wait long enough to mitigate some of the potentially dangerous repercussions and plan for our long term responsibilities in the region before taking action.
Confronting Saddam could have waited because what is not waiting is the simmering anti-American bloodlust that is sweeping the Middle East, particularly in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Invading Iraq on a thin pretext (which is what is going to happen because this war is already timed for American convenience and nothing else) is possibly going to set off a chain of events that could have been avoided if we handled the situation with a little more sophistication and finesse instead of fulfilling some long held neocon wet dream. And that is the real problem.
The Wolfowitz/Perle school never took terrorism seriously when it was becoming a threat on the world stage and they don’t take it seriously now. The influential CSP issued only 2 reports since the 1998 embassy bombing about the threat of terrorism until 9/11. The PNAC has been wringing their hands about Iraq and pushing for missile defense for years, but terrorism was hardly even on the radar screen. They are about China, Iraq, North Korea, Russia, Israel, US “benevolent” hegemony and missile defense. Period. Anything else will be subsumed under what they believe is the real agenda.
As with the ever changing justifications for the tax cuts for their rich friends, Bush and his foreign policy mavens are so blinkered and myopic and that they pursue their preordained agenda no matter what the current situation. They seem completely incapable of exercising any flexibility in light of changing circumstances. They just find a way to use the changing circumstances to justify what they plan to do anyway.
This is very dangerous. Bush, with his stupid bellicose posturing has created a needless crisis in Asia by challenging a cornered and neurotically proud despot in North Korea into a nuclear standoff. He has escalated the problem with Iraq to one of immediate danger, when it was a medium term threat at worst, and by conflating it with Al Qaeda and Muslim fundamentalism, for no good reason other than political expediency, he has made it a cause for a whole lot of disaffected people in the Mideast and Indian subcontinent to rally to.
It goes on to discuss how much this all has to do with their childlike devotion to the fantasy of missile defense.
It should be clear by now, with all we know about the bogus justifications for invading and occupying Iraq, that the Bush administration does not care about terrorism and is wedded to grandiose unilateralist ideas that were formulated during the cold war and desperately need to be re-evaluated.
This should be the basis for the Democratic critique of Bush’s foreign policy. The world is changing. The neocons refuse to see it.
In response to a post by Leah over at Eschaton and subsequent discussion of “electability” in the comments thread, a reader named Jennifer Kenney writes something that I think is insightful and worth reiterating.
This is all so ridiculous, to debate electability on the basis of policy positions. Most people – especially most people who are not policy wonks – make decisions with their guts. They like something or don’t based on its innate attractiveness, not on a careful weighing of evidence.
If this were not the case, would anyone truly think that Bush was an asset to our national security? Would he have gotten close enough to steal the election? Would the Dems be thinking about running anybody other than Hillary? Would I ever have thought I was “so in love” with that guy who was “just between jobs right now”? No, no, and Whoa Nelly! People aren’t such rational creatures.
The question isn’t whether Kerry (or anybody else) has the stance on the issues to beat Dean, the question is whether anybody else has the energy and rhetoric to beat him. Most folks aren’t aware of him (or that the primary races have even started). When they become aware of him, they’ll decide whether or not they like him from their guts, not their heads, and once they make that decision they’ll fill in all the logical policy blanks to justify that decision. That’s electability.
She’s right. Political junkies and partisans care about issues. Everybody else votes on a gut feeling or tribal identification. The politicians’ job, among other things, is to project an image and an aura that accurately captures who he is and reassures voters that he can do the job. If the politician is astute about the mood and the direction of the country, he will be able to emphasize those personal qualities that people subconsciously believe is needed at that particular time. (Biography and resume count, too. People use them as short hand.)
The post modern nature of the media makes this more important than ever. Narratives are strangely constructed and often left dangling as the herd rushes off in different directions. Truth and reality are presented as relative to which party you belong to — facts are nothing more than spin points to be debated by the candidate or his “critics.” You can’t blame people for relying more and more on their instincts to guide their political choices. It’s almost impossible for a busy person to sort out the facts and the truth about any candidate.
As much as it pains me to say it, because I thought he was a good man, Al Gore’s biggest failure as a candidate wasn’t a bad strategy and it wasn’t a lack of passion. It was a stilted and uncomfortable speaking style. It is tremendously unfair, but it is the truth. I can’t tell you how many airheaded Democratic voters I spoke to who complained about his personality. He won anyway, to be sure, but it was in spite of that handicap. Most people voted their pocketbooks and if you recall, back in 2000 this country felt invincible.
Bush, on the other hand, did as well as he did because his family name represented staid, waspy, traditional conservatism at a time when a lot of people had come to believe that the most important part of the President’s job was to project an image of rectitude. (Peace and prosperity tend to make the task of governing look easy.) His faux Texan affectations helped to deliver the south, but his policy positions and grasp of the issues was non-existent and nobody expected him to have them. He was chosen for his brand name appeal.
Interestingly, they have spent the last 3 years re-branding him as their former rival, John McCain — the straight talking war hero.
I don’t suggest that the Democrats adopt such a cynical approach. But, we are being luddites if we don’t recognize and consciously adapt to the modern political reality. Politics are now inextricably linked to entertainment values as much as civic tradition. Maybe on some level it always has been. We ignore that at our peril.
Fareed Zakaria wrote something interesting in the June 16th issue of Newsweek. I was aware of this, but now that we know the WMD threat was at best, wildly overstated, it really bears some examination.
For decades some conservatives, including many who now wield great influence, have had a tendency to vastly exaggerate the threat posed by tyrannical regimes.
It all started with the now famous “Team B” exercise. During the early 1970s, hard-line conservatives pilloried the CIA for being soft on the Soviets. As a result, CIA Director George Bush agreed to allow a team of outside experts to look at the intelligence and come to their own conclusions. Team B–which included Paul Wolfowitz–produced a scathing report, claiming that the Soviet threat had been badly underestimated.
In retrospect, Team B’s conclusions were wildly off the mark. Describing the Soviet Union, in 1976, as having “a large and expanding Gross National Product,” it predicted that it would modernize and expand its military at an awesome pace. For example, it predicted that the Backfire bomber “probably will be produced in substantial numbers, with perhaps 500 aircraft off the line by early 1984.” In fact, the Soviets had 235 in 1984.
The reality was that even the CIA’s own estimates–savaged as too low by Team B–were, in retrospect, gross exaggerations. In 1989, the CIA published an internal review of its threat assessments from 1974 to 1986 and came to the conclusion that every year it had “substantially overestimated” the Soviet threat along all dimensions. For example, in 1975 the CIA forecast that within 10 years the Soviet Union would replace 90 percent of its long-range bombers and missiles. In fact, by 1985, the Soviet Union had been able to replace less than 60 percent of them.
He does not mention that they also never admit they were wrong. Their worldview is set in stone and they are actually a bit paranoid.
Which leads me to this op-ed from today in the NY Times by Lawrence Korb, former deputy defense secretary under Reagan who questions the reasoning behind moving American bases from Germany to eastern Europe:
Since moving to new bases would not save money or improve our strategic flexibility, there must be another motive.
If the neoconservatives had ever changed course even once over the past 40 years, I might be able to buy that it was Rummy’s pique at “old Europe.” But, they have never let facts on the ground alter their plans or their total faith in their original analysis. It’s really quite easy to see why Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld are moving our troops from Germany for no good reason.
It’s because they are planning to defend Eastern Europe from Russia.
I kid you not.
We’ve gone from “Dr Strangelove” to “The Russians Are Coming”
Just read Wolfowitz’s 10 Commandments…er… The Defense Planning Guidance, 1992. From the NY Times
Senior Defense Department officials have said the document will be issued by Defense Secretary Cheney this month. According to a Feb. 18 memorandum from Mr. Wolfowitz’s deputy, Dale A. Vesser, the policy guidance will be issued with a set of “illustrative” scenarios for possible future foreign conflicts that might draw United States military forces into combat.
These scenarios, issued separately to the military services on Feb. 4, were detailed in a New York Times article last month. They postulated regional wars against Iraq and North Korea, as well as a Russian assault on Lithuania and smaller military contingencies that United States forces might confront in the future.
[…]
The draft states that with the elimination of United States short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and similar weapons at sea, the United States should not contemplate any withdrawal of its nuclear-strike aircraft based in Europe and, in the event of a resurgent threat from Russia, “we should plan to defend against such a threat” farther forward on the territories of Eastern Europe “should there be an Alliance decision to do so.”
I’ve been meaning to write once again about our good friend in Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi. He is such an interesting fellow and continues to be the favorite talking head of the “New Iraq” on cable television. It seems as if hardly a day goes by that I don’t see him speaking on behalf of Iraqis everywhere.
Slate’s Jack Shafer, who has nailed the intrepid embed Judith Miller to the proverbial wall, reports in this and other articles how reliant Ms Miller was on the ever so helpful Ahmed when she wrote her breathless accounts of the vast arsenal of unconventional weapons everyone knew for a fact were in Iraq. But then, Chalabi has been helpful with the vaunted “strong, solid” Iraqi intelligence for years.
According to the Association of Former Intelligence Officers’ May Report:
With Iraq conquered and Saddam Hussein’s regime deposed, U.S. and Iraqi sources have now provided an account of the unsuccessful strategy of deposing Saddam by a coup d’etat during the 1990’s, an effort reportedly known within CIA by the cryptonum “DBACHILLES” . The failed coup efforts carry some important lessons. They show that Iraqi intelligence penetrated the Iraqi exile-based operations. And they illustrate the damage caused by a long-running feud between Iraqi exile groups and their patrons in Washington. A media-based report follows.
[…]
Complicating the CIA’s coup planning was a similar effort in northern Iraq by Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress. A CIA officer named Bob Baer was dispatched in January 1995 to coordinate the various covert efforts, but they only got more tangled. Chalabi launched his coup attempt in March 1995, but it was unsuccessful and Baer was summoned home to Washington. Chalabi was convinced that the military-coup plan had been compromised and traveled to Washington in March 1996 to see the new CIA director, John Deutch, and his deputy, George Tenet. He told them the Iraqis had captured an Egyptian courier who was carrying an Inmarsat satellite phone to Shawani’s sons in Baghdad.
When the CIA officials seemed unconvinced, for their own good reasons, Chalabi then went to his friend Richard Perle, a prominent neoconservative. Perle is said to have called Tenet and urged that an outside committee review the Iraq situation. But the coup planning went ahead. DBACHILLES succeeded in reaching a number of senior Iraqi military officers, but was compromised and collapsed in a blood bath in June 1996.
The Iraqis began arresting the coup plotters on June 26. At least 200 officers were seized and more than 80 were executed, including Shawani’s sons. Top CIA officials reportedly blamed Chalabi for exposing the plot, and the recrimination has persisted ever since.
As a follow-on to the coup plotting, in the run-up to, and during the invasion, both Alawi and Shawani played important roles in the US/UK effort to encourage Iraqi officers to surrender or defect. It did not quite work out that way. The Iraqi military did not defect or surrender, they just went home. (Jonkers) (Wash Post, 16 May 2003, page A29 //David Ignatius)
Iraqi opposition leader Ahmad Chalabi said Sunday that he has “specific information” about links between the terror group al-Qaeda and the Iraqi intelligence service Mukhabarat.
“We have specific information about visits that leaders of al-Qaeda made to Iraq in as late as 2000, and the requests for large amounts of cash,” Chalabi said.
Chalabi, who heads up the US-backed Iraqi National Congress (INC), an organization that opposed Saddam Hussein’s ousted regime, added that he could not elaborate “because we want to chase down specifically the information so there will be an actionable case for international authorities — specifically the United States.”
Chalabi’s comments came in response to a question about a report in Britain’s Sunday Telegraph newspaper that secret Iraqi intelligence documents found in Baghdad have provided the first evidence of a direct link between Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network and Saddam Hussein’s regime.
The problem with these documents is that they are being provided by the U.S. military to a few reporters working for a very suspect newspaper, London’s Daily Telegraph (affectionately known as the Daily Torygraph” by those who understand the paper’s right-wing slant). The Telegraph’s April 27 Sunday edition reported that its correspondent in Baghdad, Inigo Gilmore, had been invited into the intelligence headquarters by U.S. troops and miraculously “found” amid the rubble a document indicating that Iraq invited Osama bin Laden to visit Iraq in March 1998.
Gilmore also reported that the CIA had been through the building several times before he found the document. Gilmore added that the CIA must have “missed” the document in their prior searches, an astounding claim since the CIA must have been intimately familiar with the building from their previous intelligence links with the Mukhabarat dating from the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Moreover, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, including Britain’s MI-6, have refuted claims of a link between bin Laden and Iraq.
Ahmad Chalabi, the exiled financier promoted by the Pentagon as a leader of postwar Iraq, claims to have obtained 25 tonnes of intelligence documents detailing Saddam Hussein’s relationship with foreign governments and Arab leaders.
The files, seized by supporters of his Iraqi National Congress (INC) from Baath party offices and secret police stations, may fuel a fresh round of recriminations and score-settling as politicians meeting in Baghdad struggle to agree the terms of an interim administration.
In interviews with Abu Dhabi television and Newsweek magazine, Chalabi has already threatened to use the papers to damage the Jordanian royal family and the Al-Jazeera television organisation, with which he has had long-running disputes.
The INC offices in London said that some of the documents may be published, but other Iraqi political groups, and the British Foreign Office, called for the files to be returned to the authorities.
The papers were collected from abandoned buildings used by Saddam’s Special Security Organisation (SSO) and the Mukhabarat intelligence service, from Baath party offices, and from the Iraqi army.
Baghdad — Relying on the help of an Iraqi political party, the United States has moved to resurrect parts of Iraq’s once-feared intelligence service, with the branch that monitors Iran among the top priorities, former Iraqi agents and politicians say.
The Iraqi National Congress, which is led by Ahmad Chalabi, the longtime exile who is now a member of the Iraqi Governing Council, says its senior officials have met with senior members of the so-called Iran and Turkey branch of the Mukhabarat, or Iraqi intelligence, over the past several weeks. The party has received documents from the intelligence officers and recruited them into a reconstituted version of the unit, said Abdulaziz Kubaisi, the Iraqi National Congress official responsible for the recruiting effort.
American officials, he said, are fully informed about what the party is doing. Iraqi intelligence officers who have been asked to rejoin the branch contend that the United States is orchestrating the effort.
“As far as what we do, we are sending back information to the Pentagon, to people who are responsible,” Kubaisi said. “They know the nature of what we’re doing. There is coordination. We have representatives of (U.S. Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld (at the Congress).”
But some Middle East experts said trying to revive the branch before a sovereign government is in place and working through a political party could backfire.
“This sets a bad precedent because you don’t have a government in place, and because Chalabi’s party is a minority and doesn’t represent the majority of Iraqis,” said Edward Walker, former ambassador to Egypt and Israel under former President George Bush and now president of the Middle East Institute, “I think it will be highly controversial to rebuild the intelligence arm when there are so many unresolved questions about Iraqi intelligence from before.”
The effort to reach out to former Iraqi intelligence officials also appears hard to harmonize with the American drive to “de-Baathify” Iraqi society, given the prominence of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein in his government.
A senior American official said concern about Iran was driving some of the discussion about moving quickly to re-establish an intelligence service. The official said the United States recognized that Iraq had a good intelligence apparatus focused on Iran because activities in the neighboring country might affect Iraqi security at home.
People close to the Iran branch said the Americans had also expressed interest in reviving the intelligence service’s Syria branch.
So, recent accounts by the CIA and Iraqis show that Iraqi intelligence infiltrated the exile groups during the 90’s. And, Ahmed Chalabi is suspected of compromising a CIA backed coup in 1995, which is one of the reasons that he’s so mistrusted in intelligence circles today. He tried to implicate one of the Iraqi CIA assets who later went on to help the US in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
He has been revealed as the main source for what seems to be the er…”highly exaggerated” claims of WMD, to the NY Times and one presumes, his pals in the Pentagon.
He is dropped into Iraq by the Pentagon while the war is still going on and finds himself alone in the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service turning up all kinds of documents that tie Saddam to al Qaeda and other Arab states like his enemies in Jordan (where he was convicted of fraud.)
Now, he is reported to be “resurrecting” the Iraqi Intelligence branch dealing with Iran and possibly Syria even though he is only the head of a nominal political party in Iraq.
I don’t know about you, but it sure seems like Ahmed Chalabi has a rather unusual and focused interest in the Iraqi intelligence apparatus for a guy who hadn’t lived in Iraq for more than 40 years and who is suspected by the CIA of causing at least 80 friendly Iraqi deaths by exposing a coup plot he was not involved in.
This man’s relationship to the top policy makers in the Pentagon needs to be looked at much more closely.
There is something very wrong with this picture.
And, just to illustrate what a true man of the Iraqi people he is, the NY Times reported on July 17th:
A delegation from Iraq’s new Governing Council, scheduled to leave Baghdad for New York, suffered a last minute defection by Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress.
Aides to Mr. Chalabi said there were several reasons for his cancelation. Prominent among them was the transport aircraft provided by the American military, which was not equipped with seats. The delegates were to be strapped onto benches for a flight to Abu Dhabi, an interim destination that also did not meet with Mr. Chalabi’s approval.
In addition to his discontent over the seating arrangements, Mr. Chalabi was reported by his aides to be unhappy that Adnan Pachachi, a 80-year-old former diplomat, had been designated chairman of the delegation in a voice vote while Mr. Chalabi was not present. Mr. Pachachi and Mr. Chalabi are rivals of sorts for leadership on the Governing Council.
If CNN is right and Diane Feinstein is a hairsbreath away from entering the Governor’s race, then we are probably one step closer to turning our democratic traditions into history. Ok. Fine.
So, let’s play hardball.
Feinstein wins the governorship … and appoints Gray Davis to her Senate seat.
Q: Thank you, Mr. President. Building sort of on that idea, it’s impossible to deny that the world is a better place in the region, certainly a better place without Saddam Hussein. But there’s a sense here in this country, and a feeling around the world, that the U.S. has lost credibility by building the case for Iraq upon sometimes flimsy or, some people have complained, non-existent evidence.
And, I’m just wondering, sir, why did you choose to take the world to war in that way?
THE PRESIDENT: You know, look, in my line of work, it’s always best to produce results. And I understand that.
Didn’t Tony Soprano say that in the first season? Maybe not. It just sounds so like him.
Now, on with the usual incomprehensible gibberish:
The — for a while the questions were, could you conceivably achieve a military victory in Iraq? You know, the dust storms have slowed you down. And I was a patient man because I realized that we would be successful in achieving our military objective.
Now, of course, the question is, will Iraq ever be free, and will it be peaceful? And I believe it will. I remind some of my friends that it took us a while to go from the Articles of Confederation to the United States Constitution. Even our own experiment with democracy didn’t happen overnight. I never have expected Thomas Jefferson to emerge in Iraq in a 90-day period.
And so, this is going to take time. And the world will see what I mean when I say, a free Iraq will help peace in the Middle East, and a free Iraq will be important for changing the attitudes of the people in the Middle East. A free Iraq will show what is possible in a world that needs freedom, in a part of the world that needs freedom.
Let me finish for a minute, John, please. Just getting warmed up. I’m kind of finding my feet. (Laughter.)
Saddam Hussein was a threat. The United Nations viewed him as a threat. That’s why they passed 12 resolutions. Predecessors of mine viewed him as a threat. We gathered a lot of intelligence. That intelligence was good, sound intelligence on which I made a decision.
Here comes the real Junior. Snotty, puerile and spoiled:
And in order to placate the critics and the cynics about intentions of the United States, we need to produce evidence. And I fully understand that.
And I’m confident that our search will yield that which I strongly believe, that Saddam had a weapons program. I want to remind you, he actually used his weapons program on his own people at one point in time, which is pretty tangible evidence. But I’m confident history will prove the decision we made to be the right decision.
Hold on for a second. You’re through. John.
I just described to you that there is a threat to the United States. And I also said, we’re doing a better job of sharing intelligence and collecting data so we’re able to find — able to anticipate. And what we really don’t want to do, it doesn’t make sense to me — seem like to me is to reveal those sources and methods.
(…unless she’s married to Joe Wilson.)
The Rice competence issue seems to have become an embarrassment to Junior, but for an unexpected reason. It’s obvious to me that here he’s barely containing his rage that people are questioning his personal involvement in the process by presuming that Condi makes decisions rather than him.
Considering he now claims that he alone is responsible for war and peace and that he personally analysed the intelligence, I think we can take the gloves off and start placing blame where it belongs. He basically said today to Bring Em On:
Q Mr. President, you often speak about the need for accountability in many areas. I wonder then, why is Dr. Condoleezza Rice not being held accountable for the statement that your own White House has acknowledged was a mistake in your State of the Union address regarding Iraq’s attempts to purchase uranium? And also, do you take personal responsibility for that inaccuracy?
THE PRESIDENT: I take personal responsibility for everything I say, of course. Absolutely. I also take responsibility for making decisions on war and peace. And I analyzed a thorough body of intelligence — good, solid, sound intelligence — that led me to come to the conclusion that it was necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
We gave the world a chance to do it. We had — remember there’s — again, I don’t want to get repetitive here, but it’s important to remind everybody that there was 12 resolutions that came out of the United Nations because others recognized the threat of Saddam Hussein. Twelve times the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions in recognition of the threat that he posed. And the difference was, is that some were not willing to act on those resolutions. We were — along with a lot of other countries — because he posed a threat.
Dr. Condoleezza Rice is an honest, fabulous person. And America is lucky to have her service. Period.
Oh yes. We’re lucky to have someone who says things like:
How can you use the name Hitler and the name of the president of the US in the same sentence? Particularly how can a German, given the devotion of the US in the liberation of Germany from Hitler?’
In addition to being honest and fabulous, Dr. Rice has quite a grasp of history, too.
I just love this next part. Asked about his gluttonous fundraising, he can’t help but brag — then quickly side-steps to some befuddled talking points about al Qaeda and the economy before making the observation that his fundraising prowess is a “barometer” of his electoral success. The codpiece swells with pride:
Q Yes, sir. And with 15 fundraisers scheduled between — for the summer months, do you worry about the perception that you’re unduly attentive to the interests of people who can afford to spend $2,000 to see you?
THE PRESIDENT: Michael, I think American people, now that they’ve realized I’m going to seek reelection, expect me to seek reelection. They expect me to actually do what candidates do. And so, you’re right, I’ll be spending some time going out and asking the American people to support me. But most of my time, as I say in my speeches — as I’m sure you’ve been bored to tears listening to — is that there is a time for politics, and that’s going to be later on. I’ve got a lot to do. And I will continue doing my job. And my job will be to work to make America more secure.
Steve asked a question about this al Qaeda possible attack. Every day I am reminded that our nation is still vulnerable. Every day I’m reminded about what 9/11 means to America. That’s a lesson, by the way, I’ll never forget, the lesson of 9/11, because — and I remember right after 9/11 saying that this will be a different kind of war, but it’s a war, and sometimes there will be action, and sometimes there won’t, but we’re still threatened. And I see that almost every day, Mike. And therefore, that is a major part of my job.
And the other part of my job that I talked about is the economic security of the American people. And I spend a lot of time on the economy, going out and talking to the American people about the economy, and will continue to do so.
But, no, listen, since I’ve made the decision to run, of course, I’m going to do what candidates do. And we’re having pretty good success, which is — it’s kind of an interesting barometer, early barometer, about the support we’re garnering.
Keil, Jeanne, and then Larry. Keil. Stretch. Super Stretch.
Allriiiight! Deke rules, dude. He pulls this kibbutzing throughout the press conference — even when they’re talking about death and carnage. This, apparently,is what they meant by honor and dignity.
The following starts out like typical spin and then turns into a bizarre (and incredibly dumb) digression about discussing “thorny issues” like the definition of “check points” with Ariel Sharon, attitude and body language in a garden and the transparent Palestinian finance minister’s web site. If you didn’t know who was talking, you’d think he was 10 years old:
Q Mr. President, you’ve been involved now in the Mideast peace process, and have certainly learned firsthand how developments like creation of a fence can complicate progress. Based on that, when you stood there about a year ago and proposed your road map, you spoke about a Palestinian state in 2005. Do you think that goal is still realistic, or is it likely to slide just because it’s so hard to make headway?
THE PRESIDENT: I do think it’s realistic. I also know when we start sliding goals, it makes progress less realistic. Absolutely, I think it’s realistic. And I think we’re making pretty good progress in a short period of time.
I’m impressed by Prime Minister Abbas’ vision of a peaceful Palestinian state. I believe him when he says that we must rout out terror in order for a Palestinian state to exist. I believe he’s true. I think Mr. Dahlan, his Security Chief, also recognizes that.
And we’ve got to help those two leaders in a couple of ways to realize that vision of a peaceful Palestinian state. One is to provide help and strategy to Mr. Dahlan so that he can lead Palestinian security forces to the dismantlement of bomb-making factories, rocket-making factories, inside Gaza and the West Bank. That’s going to be a very important part of earning the confidence of the world, for that matter. We’ve also got to recognize that there are things that can happen on the ground that will strengthen Mr. Abbas’ hand, relative to the competition, moving — for example, movement throughout the country.
So I spent time talking to Prime Minister Sharon yesterday about checkpoints. We discussed the difference between a checkpoint for security purposes, and a checkpoint that might be there that’s — that isn’t — there for inconvenience purposes. Let me put it to you that.
We talked about all the thorny issues. But the most important thing is that we now have an interlocutor in Mr. Abbas who is committed to peace, and who believes in the aspirations of the Palestinian people.
One of the most interesting visits I’ve had on this issue took place in the Oval Office there with the Finance Minister of the Palestinian Authority. I was pleased to discover that he — I think he received a degree from the University of Texas, which gave me even more confidence when he spoke. But he is a — he talked about how a free state, free country, will flourish when the Palestinians are just given a chance.
See, he believes in the Palestinian people to the point where he’s willing to take risk for peace. As I understand it, he’s put the Palestinian budget on the web page. That’s — that’s what we call transparency in the diplomatic world. It means that he’s willing to show the finances to make it clear they’re not stealing money — is another way to put it. That’s a positive development, Larry.
So I — what I first look at is attitudes. I also believe Prime Minister Sharon is committed to a peaceful Palestinian state. He’s committed because he understands that I will in no way compromise the security of the Israeli people, or the Palestinian people, for that matter, to terror; that he knows when I say we’re willing to fight terror, we mean it, because we proved it.
I thought it was interesting yesterday, by the way, that he spoke clearly about Iraq and the importance of Iraq in terms of Middle Eastern peace, as well. And I believe he’s right on that. I believe that a free Iraq will make it easier to achieve peace in that part of the world. I also know that we’ve got to get others in the neighborhood to continue to remind certain countries that it will be frowned upon if they destabilize the process.
The stated objective of Iran is the destruction of Israel, for example. And we’ve got to work in a collective way with other nations to remind Iran that they shouldn’t develop a nuclear weapon. It’s going to require more than one voice saying that, however. It’s going to require a collective effort of the Europeans, for example, to recognize the true threat of an armed Iran to achieving peace in the Middle East. And — but I’m pleased by the attitudes.
You know, when I was in Aqaba, I don’t know if you remember, but I asked Prime Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Abbas to go outside. I wanted to watch the body language, first and foremost, just to make sure we weren’t fooling ourselves, that when leaders commit to being able to work with each, you can get a pretty good sense of that commitment.
What was also interesting on the outside meeting — I mean, it was a very cordial discussion, and there was the desire for these leaders to talk. And they have talked since the Aqaba meeting, and that’s a positive development. But what was also interesting, as Condi reported to me later, to watch the discussions between the different — both Cabinets. And we were watching carefully to determine if there’s the will for peace. We have found a person who has got the will to work for peace. And that’s Prime Minister Abbas.
We’ll work through the issues that are nettlesome. And there will be some big issues that come along. But the first thing that has to happen is the Palestinian people have got to realize there’s hope in a free society. And if they choose the leader that is most likely to — choose to back the leader that is most likely to deliver that hope.
But, this discussion of the Iranian diaspora and some TV broadcast from LA really takes the yellowcake. He is literally talking nonsense:
I — all options remain on the table. I believe that the best way to deal with the Iranians at this point in time is to convince others to join us in a clear declaration that the development of a nuclear weapon is not in their interests. I believe a free Iraq will affect the lives of Iranians. I want to thank the diaspora here in the United States, particularly in L.A. — which reminds me, my last question is going to Ed. And — so you can prepare for it, Ed. We’ve got a lot of our fellow citizens who are in e-mail contact, phone contact with people who live throughout Iran. And I want to thank them for that.
Interestingly enough, there’s a TV station that I think has been — people have read about that is broadcast out of L.A. by one of our citizens. He’s — he or she has footed the bill. It’s widely watched. The people of Iran are interested in freedom, and we stand by their side. We stand on the side of those who are desperate for freedom in Iran. We understand their frustrations in living in a society that is totalitarian in nature. And now is the time for the world to come together, Ron, to send a clear message.