While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in “mission creep,” and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well.
Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.’s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different–and perhaps barren–outcome.
“Why We Didn’t Remove Saddam”George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft Time (2 March 1998)
That’s a snarky title, but it’s quite true anyway. There are going to be many different ways to evaluate this period in our history, but the prism of the father-son relationship is perhaps the most compelling — and maybe the most important. That combination of the second rate son with the manipulating neocon advisors is the stuff of Shakespeare.
Look at what Scowcroft and Bush Sr were saying and look at the state of Iraq today. It is breath-taking, isn’t it? It can really only be explained by magical thinking on the part of the neocons and the long frustrated desire on their part to conquor something. And Georgie just wanted to do what his father didn’t do — take out Saddam and win a second term. By that standard he’s been a rousing success. One wonders if he feels satisfied. He doesn’t look it.
In our endless search for explanations as to why they really did this inexplicable thing, Junior’s relationship with his father and the neocon psyche are probably the places where the answers truly lie.
I wonder what would happen if a reporter were to ask Junior how he felt about the fact that his father’s predictions of failure in Iraq had all come true? I’d really like to see that.
Thanks to Chris K for reminding me of this article.
.