Carnegie Endowment On Iran

by tristero

One of the most remarkable things about that most remarkable of periods in recent American history, 2002/2003, was that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published paper after paper, sat for interview after interview, held seminar after seminar, about the dangers of pre-emptive unilateralism (PU) in general and conquering Iraq in particular – and nobody listened despite the fact that they got it nearly exactly right.

You think it might be a good idea to listen to them now, given their track record? I mean, sure, Kenneth Pollack is better connected to Big Media, and Bill Kristol has a disarmingly goofy smile, but they were after all wrong, and lots of people died because of their little oops moment. Maybe they’re not exactly the brightest bulbs in the firmament when it comes to foreign policy. And maybe, just maybe, one might pay attention to what Carnegie’s saying right now about Iran. So….

Here’s a book they publish – and lo and behold, it’s by an Iranian – entitled Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and it looks pretty good. Shall we read it, folks? And that includes our friends on the right who comment here. If 10 of you, including the righties, pledge to read it (and be honest), I’ll contact the Endowment and see if I can get the author or some other spokesperson to answer our questions. (BTW, I’m sure there are plenty of other books to read, but this one is short and current and unusual so feel free to suggest additional reading for people, but I want to stick with this one for a blogread.)

Meanwhile, here’s some commentary I culled from the Carnegie website:

From a paper entitled Crisis in the Middle East, George Perkovich writes:

Iranian leaders risk over-reaching. If Hizbollah is perceived to lose badly (a big if), and Iran cannot come to its rescue, then Iran’s power would be diminished and the wisdom of confronting it, including on the nuclear issue, would be more apparent. And if Sunnis broadly conclude that Hizbollah and its Shiite Iranian patrons, despite the excitement generated by their anti-Israel words and deeds, actually harm Sunni interests, then resistance to Iran’s regional ambitions may become mobilized.

In other words, it will be very difficult to achieve a major defeat of Hezbollah. Indeed, one troubling result of the recent war in South Lebanon is the possibility of a stronger Sunni/Shi’a alliance against Israel. Such an alliance would enhance Iran’s standing in the region. Therefore, one way to resist this is to counterbalance ” the excitement generated by their [Hezbollah’s] anti-Israel words and deeds” by highlighting how much Iran’s ambitions will impinge Sunni interests.

Of course, we could just take the neocons’ advice and just kill ’em all and let God sort ’em out. No Shi’a, no Sunni, no problem. And I can also cure your dandruff by inviting Dick Cheney to join us for our next hunting trip. No head, no dandruff, done. Finis.

Now, here’s Joseph Cirincione:

It’s not just that the officials are saying that everything is still on the table; you can understand officials saying that. It’s beyond that. It’s very reminiscent of the coordinated campaign that we saw before the Iraq war. You have cabinet officials, the president, and the vice president giving major speeches on the subject. They’re labeling Iran the central or main threat. They try to link Iran to the war on terror, even to 9/11 itself, by talking about Iran as the central banker for terrorism, or the main state sponsor for terrorism. Officials have leaked information to the press just in the last couple of weeks that claims that the Iranian nuclear program is further advanced than it really is.

And there seems to be a concerted effort to convey this threat as imminent, without using that word, and that action will soon have to be taken. And, finally, you hear a drumbeat from both the neoconservatives and the Israeli lobby arguing for military action on Iran. None of this is conclusive in and of itself, but together they really present a very ominous picture. And it is now my working hypothesis that at least some members of the administration, including the vice president of the United States, have made up their mind that the preferred option is to strike Iran and that a military strike will destabilize the regime and contribute to their longtime goal of overthrowing the government of Iran.

You really can’t, I guess, comment on how strong the regime in power is in Iran, but it seems like a risky plan.

I believe a military strike would consolidate the hold of the Islamic government, not loosen it. If you want to keep President [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad in power for the next five years, launch a strike on an Iranian facility. There is no doubt in my mind that the Iranian people would rally around the government and would become convinced that what the government has been telling them is true, that the main threat to the Iranian people comes from the United States or the U.S.-Israeli alliance. I can’t think of any more counterproductive move if you have the goal of enabling the Iranian people to choose their own government, than to launch a military strike against Iran now.

What is your analysis of Iran’s nuclear progress so far?

This is the key point. This is where I believe this whole debate should go over the next six months. The Iranian threat is a serious one but it is not an imminent one. Iran does not have a nuclear weapon; it is not going to get a nuclear weapon this year or even this decade. The Iranians are at least ten years away from the ability to enrich uranium either for fuel rods or a nuclear weapon.

You’re sure about that?

Everything we’ve seen indicates that that is in fact the case, and this is the consensus opinion of the U.S. intelligence agencies. We have a national intelligence estimate that was done last year and discussed in the Washington Post in August 2005 that reached the conclusion that Iran is five to ten years away. We’ve had testimony this year from John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, which confirms that U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Iran will not be able to construct a bomb until “sometime in the middle of the next decade.”

Now, what we need to do is declassify that intelligence estimate. Let’s get all the facts out on the table. Let’s examine this evidence in public, as to what Iran’s capabilities are and what various estimates are as to the nuclear timeline. If those intelligence estimates are wrong let’s find out why.

Sounds entirely reasonable to me.

By the way, Cirincione was recently interviewed on Fresh Air about Iran. I couldn’t find the link but if anyone has it, please post in comments.