The President Goes All-In

by poputonian

Tonight the reckless Gambler-in-Chief will try to throw his last soldier-chips into the Iraqi pot. One last gambit so George can achieve hero-hood, which is all he ever wanted to do, to be a bigger hero than he thinks people believe his daddy to be. This has always been personal to George Bush, a belief in himself that he is larger than America.

So, just for a little contrast, this might be a good time to visit a scenario that played out in September of 1776 when the United States was, oh, about sixty days old. It illustrates how the first Commander-in-Chief, when faced with a military crisis, listened to his generals and turned into a retreatin’ surrender-monkey. George Washington and his generals faced a tough question: save New York or save America?

It was early September and the American army had just been driven from Long Island by the British troops. The Americans were positioned around New York City with an idea to defend it when the British came ashore. But one of Washington’s trusted subordinates, General Nathanael Green sent him this letter:

The critical situation which the army is in, will, I hope, sufficiently apologize for my troubling your Excellency with this letter. The sentiments are dictated I am sure by an honest mind, a mind who feels deeply interested in the salvation of his Country; and for the honor and reputation of the General under whom he serves. The object under consideration is whether a general and speedy retreat from this Island is necessary or not. To me it appears the only eligible plan to oppose the Enemy successfully and secure ourselves from disgrace.
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The City and Island of New York, are no objects for us; we are not to bring them in competition with the general interest of America.
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It is our business to study to avoid any considerable misfortune, and to take post where the Enemy will be obliged to fight us, and not we them. The sacrifice of the vast property of New York, and the suburbs, I hope has no influence upon your Excellency’s measures. Remember the King of France when Charles the Fifth, Emperor of Germany, invaded his Kingdom, he laid whole Provinces to waste; and by that policy he starved and ruined Charles’s Army, and defeated him without fighting a battle. Two thirds of the property of the City of New York and the suburbs belongs to the Tories. We have no very great reason to run any considerable risk for its defense.
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If we attempt to hold the City and Island, and should not be able to, we shall be wasting of time unnecessarily, and betray a defect of judgment, if no worse misfortune attends it.

So surrender-monkey Greene suggests they cut and run:

I give it as my opinion that a general and speedy retreat is absolutely necessary and that the honor and interest of America requires it.

Washington then gathered his generals for a council of war, as Greene had suggested, and revealed the results in a letter to Congress on September 8th:

On every side there is a choice of difficulties.
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In deliberating on this great question [of retreat], it was impossible to forget that history, our own experience, the advice of our ablest friends in Europe, the fears of the Enemy, and even the declarations of Congress demonstrate that on our side the war should be defensive.

It has been even called a war of posts, that we should on all occasions avoid a general action or put anything to risk unless compelled by a necessity into which we ought never to be drawn. The Arguments on which such a system was founded were deemed unanswerable, and experience has given her sanction.

With these views, the honor of making a brave defense does not seem to be a sufficient stimulus when the success is very doubtful.

But how would George Surrender-Monkey Washington tell Congress he was going to cut and run? Actually, that part was easy because of who he was:

I am sensible a retreating army is encircled with difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a General to reproach, and that the common cause may be affected by the discouragement it may throw over the minds of many.

But when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, when the wisdom of cooler moments and experienced men have decided that we should protract the war [by retreating], if possible, I cannot think it safe or wise to adopt a different system.

This was always about America to George Washington, a belief in country that was larger than himself.