He has always been an absolute disaster. Here is an interview with Barr from an oral history of the 1992 LA riots. It sounds familiar. Gangs then, Antifa now.
He’s always been a wingnut loon:
William P. Barr
Attorney generalThe state verdict came down on the cops. I was out in a press conference within a few minutes of it…. I went down to the press room and said, “There’s still a pending Federal investigation. This isn’t the end of the process. The Federal government will still continue to review this, blah, blah, blah. But we’re not going to tolerate any of this stuff out in the streets.”
Then [President Bush] called and wanted to know what we were up to and make sure we got a statement out. I said we’d just gotten a statement out. Then he said he wanted me to come by. I guess actually, later, as things got worse in California, he said he wanted me to come by the next morning at six or some ungodly hour. Overnight I had prepared this plan to use 2,000 or more Federal officers to supplement what was out there, basically to enforce the law out there. A lot of people think that the Department of Justice can just click its fingers and get a lot of resources, but the fact of the matter is it’s very difficult. We had only 150 marshals available as part of their special operations group. We put together an amazing polyglot organization of FBI, SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] teams, U.S. marshal SWAT teams, Border Patrol special operations group, a prison special operations group, and things like that. Even the Park Police put in their SWAT team.
We scraped together 2,000 people and told them to stand by at different airports and rally early that morning, because I figured the President might want something done. I showed up at the meeting. I had to go with [FBI Director William] Sessions.
The President wanted to know what the violence was about, and I told him that there were a lot of street gangs involved and this was primarily centered on street gang activity. I told him the names of the gangs that were involved, that the violence was largely street gang activity, big-time gang, not like street gangs in the 1950s—Crips-type gangs.
I explained that the L.A. police force is a very small police force—it’s highly mobile, but it’s very small. I said, “The National Guard is all screwed up, and they’re having trouble getting the National Guard there. We have two other choices. You can get as many civil guys out there as you can, and I have 2,000 who can move, but I would need air support from—” [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin] Powell was sitting there. I said, “I need Colin’s help in getting them out there, but I could get you 2,000 people out there by three or four in the afternoon, assuming the military transports were available.”
I said, “The only other alternative would be regular Army.” We had just gone through an exercise two years earlier in St. Croix, so I was very familiar with how to use regular Army in a domestic situation. I understood all the code sections and what you had to do…. Basically the President has to issue a proclamation telling people to cease and desist and go to their homes. It’s sort of an antiquated statute. And then if they don’t cease and desist, you’re allowed to use regular Army.
…I said we can get everything ready to use Federal troops, but that was really the only other alternative. And Colin Powell said what troops were available, what bases, and so forth.
So he said, “Go ahead. Let’s launch those civilian guys. Let’s not try to resort to regular military right now.” I said, “Okay, who should I have [Deputy Attorney General] George Terwilliger talk to?” Powell gave me a name. And in an hour, they had transports starting off on the East Coast flying across the country, landing at Birmingham, Alabama, picking up the FBI agents there, landing in the next city, basically hopscotching across the country. Then they had Air Force buses waiting at the Air Base busing these guys in. So we did get everybody out there at the time I said.
I was hanging around the Oval Office at that point, and the president was on the phone to the governor. He was on the phone to the mayor, getting reports, asking, “Where’s the National Guard? When can you get the National Guard up there?” Very much engaged.
While I was there, he probably talked three or four times to the governor and one of the members of the Cabinet who was out there in California at the time. He talked to him. He was very engaged. He talked to some civil rights leaders who were calling in, and he was very much in command. Then he made the decision toward the end of the day that more power would be needed, and so we implemented the plan of using Federal forces. That was an interesting episode.
Q: Did he go out there?
Barr: No, but he went later.
…
Q: Was President Bush shocked by this dramatic event in Los Angeles? Did it have an effect on him? Did he see it as an indicator of something wrong that had to be fixed in America?
Barr: I can’t tell the extent to which he was shocked. He seemed surprised and wondered what was going on, what was this all about, and why the violence, that ugly violence. He asked me. Some people would probably disagree with what I told him, but I did lay a lot of it on gang activity.
Q: And you had a program to try and deal with that kind of thing.
Barr: Yes.
Q: But that didn’t galvanize.
Barr: Well, no one stopped me. We did make a lot of progress against gangs. But he wasn’t as comfortable in that policy area, I guess. My basic take was that this was not civil unrest or the product of some festering injustice. This was gang activity, basically opportunistic. I don’t know why he wasn’t more interested in these issues.
[President Bush] turns to Brent and he says, ‘Brent…how do I federalize the National Guard?’ Brent says, ‘I’m not sure I know either, Mr. President. I probably need to call Colin [Powell].’ I can’t believe this. So he gets Colin Powell on the phone and he’s going ‘Uh-huh, uh-huh, okay.’ Colin says, ‘All you’ve got to do is say it.’