Lessons learned

Lessons Learned

by digby

Here’s an interesting round up of the various ways in which the bin Laden operation was the results of different policies:
The first two examples are fairly mundane. But the last is important:

Intel Reform—Better Sharing, Better Use. Steve Coll writes in The New Yorker. Military Command—More Effective Leadership.[Obama was a gusty guy who ordered a gutsy operation etc.)Interrogation Reform—A Different Quality of Partnership. We’ve seen some diehard torture supporters arguing that, because some of the first clues to the identity of bin Laden’s courier came from Bush-era Guantánamo detainees, “torture worked.” There are two problems with this assertion. First, the Bush administration claimed to have barred the most objectionable interrogation practices in 2003 and extended Geneva protections to detainees in 2006—but, as Jane Mayer points out in The New Yorker, the real name of the courier apparently wasn’t obtained until four years ago. And on Monday, former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said, “It is true that some information that came from normal interrogation approaches at Guantánamo did lead to information that was beneficial in this instance. But it was not harsh treatment and it was not waterboarding.” It’s thus hard to say the torture is what led to this weekend’s mission in Abbottabad. Second, and more important, any tips from Guantánamo had to be supplemented by a flood of on-the-ground work, and presumably more interrogations, and more talk with friendly sources, and more purchased intel—much of which, apparently, came in the last eight months. Not coincidentally, we have seen considerable improvement in cooperation with Pakistani and Western intelligence agencies in the post-Bush years, as confidence in U.S. interrogation practices, and thus in the political safety of admitting cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies, improved. I’m not arguing that everything is perfect now, just that no one has been sent to Guantánamo lately and global perceptions have improved, the results of which have been increased ability to operate on the ground and receive shared information

Surprise.

That all sounds pretty good. I wonder how all the sabre rattling about (nuclear armed) Pakistan will affect this new found cooperation?

I have no idea if Pakistani leaders knew of bin Laden’s presence. It seems absurd that at least some of them didn’t. But then, there’s nothing new in that suspicion. I’ve been hearing that for years. Just last month there was this:

The state of relations, while never being perfect, is now alarming, Wall Street Journal reported quoting top US security officials who said the tensions are costing US the chance to hit key terrorists in the region. US officials say the Pakistan’s ISI is no longer providing the targeting information and as a result there have been no drone attacks in Pakistan’s turbulent tribal region since January 23. While, some officials and experts say that weather may be a factor but this is one of the longest periods without a strike since the start of the Obama administration.Drone strikes peaked in September 2010 with a record 22 attacks claiming as many as 321 lives of terrorists but they have been falling to as low as just seven since the beginning of new year. The paper said US intelligence officials suggest that the sharp drop in strikes may be because CIA is having trouble in pinpointing new ‘Haqqani’ network targets, either because the militants have gone deeper into hiding or have moved to new areas, possibly with the help of ISI.The Haqqani network has long used the Miranshah, the capital of North Waziristan as its main base of operations in Pakistan. But US officials says there are signs that the group may be shifting base to nearby Kurram agency on directions of ISI. US has been exerting pressure on Pakistan to launch a major military operation in North Waziristan, but the Pakistan military has been dilly dallying a response for the past six months. The falling out was traced by US officials to a series of controversial incidents starting late last year, which prompted tit-for-tat accusations that burst into the open with the outing of CIA station chief of Pakistan in December. The CIA official had to leave Pakistan when he was publicly named and the Americans blamed ISI for leaking the identity. The paper said the pause may have been to enable the Pakistan military and the ISI to direct the Haqqani network. Jeff Dressler, a leading US insurgency expert on the Haqqani network told the paper the shifting of base by the Haqqanis would provide the group’s fighters, who are aligned with al-Qaeda and Taliban, with more space and easier access to Afghan capital Kabul. “The ISI has tracked the movement of Haqqani’s but the Pakistan government has now shared that intelligence with the US intelligence,” a top US official said.He said “no one can move out of Miranshah without the Pakistan government getting to know it, especially the bigger fish.”

Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Congress’ Senate Committee said here yesterday that she sees now the CIA-ISI relationship as “something less than whole hearted partnership” because the ISI is “walking both sides of the street”.

Let’s just say that all the shock and dismay this week that members of the Pakistani government may have knows where bin Laden was hiding rings just a little bit hollow.

I certainly have no idea who knew what when. But these problems in the relationship have been there for some time. Considering the stakes, it would be a shame if anyone were to use the bin Laden operation as an excuse to totally blow it up.

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