Bad Idea

by digby

The ongoing back and forth about why liberal hawks shouldn’t have supported the invasion of Iraq because they should have known that the Bush administration was incompetent or known it was impossible to succeed continues. And all those things are correct. But I never hear anyone discuss why invading Iraq was a bad decision on the merits.

For reasons I’ve never been able to fathom, a whole bunch of liberal hawks accepted the premise of the Bush Doctrine without considering the ramifications of such a doctrine and whether it was wise to adopt it. Right after 9/11 the Doctrine was a simple formulation that if a government harbored terrorist enemies of the United States, they too were considered an enemy of the United States. That made some sense, particularly as it was applied to Afghanistan. After all, the Taliban didn’t just have terrorists in its midst, it was actively working with them and supporting them. Deposing them was an obvious reaction to the terrorist attacks and very few but the purely pacifist (a thoroughly respectable but extremely rare principle in our culture) objected to it. Indeed, most Americans, hawk and dove alike, agreed after 9/11 that any government that would actively help such criminals as bin Laden had to be stopped.

But soon the Bush Doctrine took on a new character altogether which came almost verbatim from an infamous Defense Department document written by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 (and rejected by Bush’s father.) I won’t go into the details of that (if you’re unfamiliar with that you can read up on it here) except to point out that the concept of preventive war was folded into the Bush Doctrine and accepted as if it had always been there and that the nation had embraced it just as they’d embraced the much simpler, earlier doctrine. They had also very cleverly hijacked the term “pre-emptive” (which had long been an accepted form of self-defense) to mean the more sinister and illegal term “preventive” which had been rejected by all civilized nations for decades. And lo and behold, Iraq was immediately seen as the first nation in need of such “pre-emption.”

We all knew that certain members of the Bush administration had been obsessed with Iraq for a decade for reasons that had nothing to do with terrorism. And while their obsession did not automatically delegitimize their argument to go into Iraq after 9/11, it certainly should have given liberal hawks some pause. Here was, after all, a group of people who robotically insisted “9/11 changed everything” and yet it had not, evidently, changed their view on Iraq at all, nor had they even taken a moment to reassess. You could smell the opportunism in the air and that should have made smart people skeptical. Nobody knew for sure what the state of Iraq’s WMD arsenal or programs were, of course (although the shaky nature of the “evidence” certainly made my tin-foil hat chirp and squawk like crazy.) But we did know that he had successfully been contained for twelve years and after 9/11 there were good reasons not to rush into anything without a full reassessment of everything. And my God, were they ever rushing into it.

Virtually none of the foreign policy establishment were concerned that invading Iraq was a bad strategy in light of the threat of terrorism. It was obvious that we would inflame the Islamic radicals and create more of them — an American occupying army in the mideast at a time of rising extremism and anti-American fervor was about as provocative an act as could have been imagined. This argument was glossed over as some sort of appeasement when, in fact, it was extremely salient. Why on earth would you go out of your way to aid the recruitment of your enemy unless it was absolutely necessary? The administration may need to play to its base with useless strongman preening but there was no excuse for liberal hawks not to care about this argument.

But the greatest strategic error was dismissing the possibility that by occupying Iraq it would empower Iran in the process. This was indoubtedly seen as pessimism or immoral realpolitik by the neocons and liberal hawks, but it was a very serious consideration that we are now seeing played out before our very eyes. It’s quite clear that the most successful beneficiary of our Iraq policy has been Iraq’s longtime rival, Iran. Had Iraq really presented the existential threat the administration claimed, it might have made sense. But nobody but the most deluded of neocons believed that Saddam was planning to launch drone planes filled with nukes and chemical weapons at the US. There should have been more attention paid to the ramifications of empowering Iran before we invaded Iraq by people who should know better. (The great irony is that the administration is now recycling the same fearmongering to use against Iran — instead of “gassed his own people” it’s “denies the holocaust.” SOS)

So, in the months before we went into Iraq the situation was this:

• The Bush Doctrine was morphing before our eyes into a permission slip for unilateral aggression based on nothing more than guesswork about a possible future threat, degrading our moral authority before the war even started.
• Many of our allies were balking which meant that we would potentially lose valuable cooperation on terrorism and would have a much harder time coalition building in the future.
• Saddam had been successfully contained for more than a decade and could have stayed contained for some time, even if the hyped up threat assessment had turned out to be correct.
• The evidence for terrorist ties between Iraq and al Qaeda was virtually non-existent and there was no reason to believe that they would ever have the same goals. Conversely, invading iraq was likely to empower islamic extremism in Iraq and elsewhere.
• We rushed into it as if it were an emergency when Saddam had done nothing for years. This meant that planning (which never happened anyway) would have had to be done on a crisis basis, increasing the chance of mistakes and missteps.
• We were commmitting our military to a non-urgent long term operation at a time when we needed them to be flexible for the emerging threats of the new era of Islamic extremism.
• We knew that upending the structure of the middle east before we had a chance to fully assess the situation could result in empowering the actors we wanted to marginalize, both state and non-state.

For all those reasons one could see not just that it was an impossible task or that the Bush administration would mess it up but that it was simply a bad idea when the circumstances after 9/11 dictated that we be smart about national security. 9/11 didn’t change everything but you’d think the threat of terrorism and assymetrical warfare would have changed the neocon and liberal hawk’s longtime assumptions about the efficacy of traditional military power. If there was ever a time for realism — in the pure sense of the word — it was then. Instead, we had the right lashing out incoherently at their ancient demons and the liberal hawks naively believing that it was a good idea to express our goodness and greatness through a military action that was quite obviously unnecessary at that moment and for which the risk far outweighed the benfit.

We all know that the result was even worse that we feared. We couldn’t know they did no planning at all for the occupation. It didn’t occur to us that they would literally bring in 20 something college Republicans to run the reconstruction. I couldn’t imagine they would botch it so thoroughly on every level that we have now exposed ourselves as something of a paper tiger when it comes to such unilateral actions. It’s weakened us considerably. (And it’s also brought us to a very frightening point…) The abandonment of moral authority with aggressive war and torture, the lost opportunities in Afghanistan, the empowering of Iran are all fall-out from this terrible decision and while we couldn’t necessarily know exactly what would happen, there was NO DOUBT that the outcome was unpredictable. Great powers can’t afford to run dangerous military experiments with unpredictable results unless it’s absolutely necessary. Blowback tends to be rather extreme.

The administration dazzled the nation with a big show and the media was chomping at the bit to have a “real” war that they could cover. But when you stripped away all the hysterical rhetoric it was clear then that even if the Bush administration had been capable of preventing Iraq from descending into chaos and achieving all its goals, liberal hawks should have known that rushing into war in the spring of 2003 was a bad idea anyway.

.