March 7, 2003 Revisitedby poputonian
How could anyone have known back then that invading Iraq was going to be a mistake wrought with negative consequences?

The speech that follows was surely heard by the key planners in America, including everyone in the White House. It was delivered to the United Nations Security Council just days before the Iraq invasion. The speaker used the same reports and evidence available to the US. Note how accurate his comments were:

– He correctly ascertains the degree to which Iraq represented a threat to the world, and to its neighbors.- He identifies the convergence of international institutions as the reckoning force that was successfully disarming Iraq.- He debunks the Iraq / al Qaeda link.- He predicts that innocent families would suffer.- He forecasts the postwar carnage.- And, he zeroes in on the Bush administration’s disingenuous motives for war.

He did all this before the Iraq invasion; I’ll keep his identity hidden until the end of the post.[Excerpted]

I would like to thank Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei for the presentation they have just given us.
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And what have the inspectors told us?
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Significant evidence of real disarmament has now been observed.
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Therefore, I would like solemnly to address a question to this body, and it’s the very same question being asked by people all over the world. Why should we now engage in war with Iraq? And I would also like to ask, why smash the instruments that have just proven their effectiveness? Why choose division when our unity and our resolve are leading Iraq to get rid of its weapons of mass destruction? Why should we wish to proceed by force at any price when we can succeed peacefully?
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War is always an acknowledgment of failure. Let us not resign ourselves to the irreparable. Before making our choice, let us weigh the consequences. Let us measure the effects of our decision. And it’s clear to all in Iraq, we are resolutely moving toward completely eliminating programs of weapons of mass destruction. The method that we have chosen worked.
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The information supply (inaudible) has been verified by the inspectors and is leading to the elimination of banned ballistic equipment. We must proceed the same way with all the other programs: with information, verification and destruction. We already have useful information in the biological and chemical domain.
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With regard to nuclear weapons, Mr. ElBaradei’s statement confirmed … the IAEA will be able to certify the dismantlement of Iraq’s program.
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What conclusions can we draw? That Iraq, according to the very terms used by the inspectors, represents less of a danger to the world than it did in 1991, that we can achieve our objective of effectively disarming that country. Let us keep the pressure on Baghdad.
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The adoption of Resolution 1441, the assumption of converging positions by the vast majority of the world’s nations, diplomatic action by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned movement, all of these common efforts are bearing fruit.
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The American and British military presence in the region lends support to our collective resolve. We all recognize the effectiveness of this pressure on the part of the international community, and we must use it to go through with our objective of disarmament through inspections.
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As the European Union noted, these inspections cannot continue indefinitely. The pace must therefore be stepped up. That is why [we] wants to make three proposals today.
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First, let us ask the inspectors to establish a hierarchy of tasks for disarmament, and, on that basis, to present us, as quickly as possible, with the work program provided for by Resolution 1284. We need to know immediately which priority issues could constitute the key disarmament tasks to be carried out by Iraq.
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Secondly, we propose that the inspectors give us a progress report every three weeks. This will make the Iraqi authorities understand that in no case may they interrupt their efforts.
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And finally, let us establish a schedule for assessing the implementation of the work program. Resolution 1284 provides for a time frame of 120 days. We are willing to shorten it if the inspectors consider it feasible.
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The military agenda must not dictate the calendar of inspections. We agree to timetables and to an accelerated calendar, but we cannot accept an ultimatum as long as the inspectors are reporting cooperation. That would mean war. That would lead the Security Council to relinquish its responsibility.
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By imposing a deadline of only a few days, would we merely be seeking a pretext for war? As a permanent member of the Security Council, I will say it again: [We] will not allow a resolution to pass that authorizes the automatic use of force.
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Let us be clear-sighted. We are defining a method to resolve crisis. We are choosing how to define the world we want our children to live in.
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These crises have many roots. They are political, religious, economic. Their origins lie deep in the turmoil of history.
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There may be some who believe that these problems can be resolved by force, thereby creating a new order. But this is not what [we] believes. On the contrary, we believe that the use of force can arouse resentment and hatred, fuel a clash of identities and of cultures, something that our generation has a prime responsibility to avoid.
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To those who believe that war would be the quickest way of disarming Iraq, I can reply that it will drive wedges and create wounds that will be long in healing. And how many victims will it cause? How many families will grieve?
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We do not subscribe to what may be the other objectives of a war. Is it a matter of regime change in Baghdad? No one underestimates the cruelty of this dictatorship or the need to do everything possible to promote human rights. But this is not the objective of Resolution 1441. And force is certainly not the best way of bringing about democracy. Here and elsewhere it would encourage dangerous instability.
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Is it a matter of fighting terrorism? War would only increase it and we would then be faced with a new wave of violence.
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Is it finally a matter of recasting the political landscape of the Middle East? In that case, we run the risk of exacerbating tensions in a region already marked by great instability. Not to mention that in Iraq itself, the large number of communities and religions already represents a danger of a potential break-up.
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We all have the same demands. We want more security and more democracy. But there is another logic other than the logic of force. There is another path. There are other solutions. We understand the profound sense of insecurity with which the American people have been living since the tragedy of September 11, 2001. The entire world shared the sorrow of New York and of America struck in the heart. And I say this in the name of our friendship for the American people, in the name of our common values: freedom; justice; tolerance.
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But there is nothing today to indicate a link between the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda. And will the world be a safer place after a military intervention in Iraq? I want to tell you what my country’s conviction is: It will not.
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Four months ago, we unanimously adopted a system of inspections to eliminate the threat of potential weapons of mass destruction and to guarantee our security. Today, we cannot accept, without contradicting ourselves, a conflict that might well weaken it. Yes, we also want more democracy in the world. But we can only achieve this objective within the framework of a true global democracy based on respect, sharing, the awareness of a true community of values and a common destiny, and its core is the United Nations. Let us make no mistake, in the face of multiple and complex threats, there is no single response, but there is a single necessity — we must remain united.
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Today we must together invent a new future for the Middle East. Let us not forget the immense hope created by the efforts of the Madrid conference and the Oslo agreement. Let us not forget that the Mideast crisis represents our greatest challenge in terms of security and justice. For us, the Middle East, like Iraq, represents a priority commitment, and this calls for even greater ambition and boldness. We should envision a region transformed through peace; civilizations that, through the courage of reaching out to each other, rediscover their self-confidence and an international prestige equal to their long history and their aspirations.
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Mr. President, in a few days, we must solemnly fulfill our responsibility through a vote. We will be facing an essential choice: disarming Iraq through war or through peace. And this crucial choice implies others; it implies the international community’s ability to resolve current or future crises; it implies a vision of the world, a concept of the role of the United Nations.
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[We], therefore, believes that to make this choice, to make it in good conscience in this forum of international democracy, before our peoples and before the world, the heads of state and government must meet again here in New York at the Security Council. This is in everyone’s interest. We must rediscover the fundamental vocation of the United Nations, which is to allow each of its members to assume its responsibilities in the face of the Iraqi crisis, but also to seize together the destiny of a world in crisis and thus to create the conditions for our future unity.
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Thank you, Mr. President.

Excerpted remarks as delivered by France’s Foreign Minister to Security Council and recorded by the Federal News Service. March 7, 2003. New York. Note: all the bracketed [we]’s above replaced “France” in the text.
This speech shows the remarkably accurate observations made by someone able to detach from the emotional context of a tense situation, which is what a skilled Chief Excutive is able to do. Our friend, Mr. De Villepin, was calm and reserved, and able to think with disciplined restraint. The American Chief Executive, on the other hand, was, for whatever reason, unable to grasp the same evidence seen by others. The results speak for themselves. The point now is not to ask how anyone could have missed the evidence that others could see, nor is it to insist that America should have known. The point is, how can anyone today, with the advantage of retrospection, still deny what was evident on March 7, 2003?