Spooked

by digby

ReddHedd has the full deconstrution of John Dickerson’s juicy new memoir of his role in the Plame case today, so I will just give you the link to follow if you haven’t already been there. I just want to make a couple of observations.

Dickerson says that this push-back by administration officials was highly unusual:

What struck me was how hard both officials were working to knock down Wilson. Discrediting your opposition is a standard tactic in Washington, but the Bush team usually played the game differently. At that stage in the first term, Bush aides usually blew off their critics. Or, they continued to assert their set of facts in the hope of overcoming criticism by force of repetition.

[…]

At this point the information about Valerie Plame was not the radioactive material it is today. No one knew she might have been a protected agent—and for whatever reason, the possibility didn’t occur to us or anyone else at the time. But it was still newsworthy that the White House was using her to make its case. That Scooter Libby and Karl Rove mentioned Plame to Matt was an example of how they were attempting to undermine Wilson. They were trying to make his trip look like a special family side deal not officially sanctioned by the agency. No one at a high level in the government was worried enough about the veracity of the uranium claim to send a “real” special envoy. And no one at a high level ever saw Wilson’s report when he returned. Later we would learn that Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley had been warned by the CIA that the uranium claims were shaky and that Wilson’s wife was one of many people involved in the decision to send her husband.

I’ve always thought there was something quite unusual about the fact that they copped to the 16 words. This is a group that never admits to doing anything wrong ever. yet, they did it this time in an apparent effort to contain this story. According to Dickerson’s recital, they were close to panic.

What was it about Wilson that had them so spooked that they would break with their highly successful methods? It’s true that it was an escalating battle between the CIA and the White House over who was oging to get blamed for the WMD failure. Why didn’t they just blow off their critics, get Tenent to take the fall, repeat their mantra like robots and move on?

I suspect that it has to do with Niger forgeries, but that’s a guess. The IAEA had long before debunked them, but considering the infighting, Wilson’s connection to the CIA may have made them very nervous. (Still no word on that, hmmmm?)

And maybe it’s just the fact that there were no WMD. If I had hyped the danger as much as they did, I might have been spooked too. But they got over it. They quickly pulled themselves together and developed a better strategy. Just before the Special Prosecutor was appointed, the Financial Times reported:

“We let the earthmovers roll in over this one.”

Or so they thought.

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