The Democratic Revolution
After all, the real purpose of the war, we’re told, was to turn Iraq into a model for other Middle Eastern states to follow. I think this explanation is essentially correct, and what’s more, I agree that it’s the only real justification the war had.
But, he then wonders why they didn’t do sufficient planning for the post-war period.
I think that things like this happen for a variety of reasons, some of which Kevin mentions — like the fact that certain people believed the nonsense that Iraqis would be so grateful that they would show up for work on Monday and everything would fall into place.
And, in fact there was some planning, but they planned for all the wrong things — like a massive refugee crisis that never materialized. (Competence and prescience are not the strong suit of the ivory tower neoconservatives.)
But, the main reason they didn’t plan better is because this so-called real purpose for the war is no more the actual purpose than WMD or ties to terrorism. It is a happy talking point designed to lull good hearted Americans into believing that we are on a grand humanitarian mission. (In fact, its main purpose may have been to gain the support of George W. Bush.)
The reality is that the invasion of Iraq is nothing more than a cold and straightforward demonstration of American military power for the purpose of intimidating enemies and to enable a long term strategic placement of troops and equipment in the region.
This is made quite clear in the PNAC’s defense strategy document that pre-dated 9/11 and formed the basis for the Bush Doctrine:
“Facing up to the realities of multiple constabulary missions that will require a permanent allocation of U.S.forces.”
“Need for a larger U.S. security perimeter” and the U.S. “should seek to establish a network of ‘deployment bases’ or ‘forward operating bases’ to increase the reach of current and future forces.”
“North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or similar states [will not be allowed] to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies, or threaten the American homeland itself.”
“Main military missions” necessary to “preserve Pax Americana” and a “unipolar 21st century” are the following: “secure and expand zones of democratic peace, deter rise of new great-power competitor, defend key regions (Europe, East Asia, Middle East), and exploit transformation of war.”
The PNAC report concludes that the global order “must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence.”
As for Iraq, it explicitly says:
“The U.S. has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in the Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein.”
It also mentions “Saudi domestic sensibilities,” and calls for a permanent Gulf military presence even “should Saddam pass from the scene” because “Iran may well prove as large a threat.”
It was only after Powell briefly prevailed in keeping the neocons on their leash after 9/11 that the neocons fell back on their pal Michael Ledeen’s old bogus arguments from the 80’s about exporting a “democratic revolution.”
After others like Michael Kelly rolled out the new talking points in the summer of 2002, Ledeen himself opined in the Wall Street Journal:
If we come to Baghdad, Damascus and Tehran as liberators, we can expect overwhelming popular support. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it well the other day when he encouraged his media questioners to think about the people in such places as prisoners, not as free men and women. They will join us if they believe we are serious, and they will only believe we are serious when they see us winning. Our first move must therefore show both our power and our liberating intent.
It pays to remember that in 1985 he also wrote:
”America has voiced against Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan power of Central America, however, we have not acted upon it. If we fail to act, our Cuban and Nicaraguan enemies will slowly set their conflict throughout the hemisphere.”
This will only discourage others who are contemplating “taking up the struggle for democratic revolution.” Also, failure to act in Central America, will make the US lose credibility among other nations; causing other regimes not to listen to our advice. They will say, “If America cannot protect a nearby ally against Nicaragua, can it be expected to shelter a distant friend against the Soviet Union itself?”
“We should remain true to our principles—supporting the democratic revolution in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, while thwarting and reversing the totalitarian advance, in order to persuade others to take risks for freedom and democracy.”
I don’t suggest that Michael Ledeen doesn’t believe what he says, although like all the neocons, he is always wrong in his predictions. I do know that he is full of really wacked out ideas, not the least of which was his recent temper tantrum suggesting that we might want to think about declaring war on France.
But, his “democratic revolution” argument was never an explicit part of the neocon argument for removing Saddam until the Spring of 2002, when the neocon faction was pressing its case for invasion.
The big strategic reason for invading and occupying Iraq has been public since Wolfowitz’s 1992 Defense Policy Guidance that formed the basis for the PNAC document and the Bush Doctrine.
Demonstrate our military prowess and willingness to use it.
Establish a permanent military presence in the region.
Prove that leaders of rogue states will not be allowed to undermine American leaders, intimidate American allies, or threaten the American homeland itself.
All the rest is up for grabs. If Iraq becomes a democracy, all to the good (unless they elect someone hostile to us.) But, the plan certainly does not require an outbreak of democracy in the mid-east for it to be perceived as successful by its planners. What matters is that we won easily and our military is established on the ground in the region for the forseeable future. That’s why we really did it.
Whether those successes bring about the expressed goal of global order based on a “secure foundation of unquestioned U.S. military preeminence” remains to be seen. It’s entirely possible that it will result in exactly the opposite. And that Americans will pay a steep price for such hubris.