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Blinkered Agenda

Soto over at Daily Kos does some more damage to Tom Friedman and also references this important article by Nicholas Lemann in the New Yorker on the Mid-east grand plan.

But as you read the Lemann article and evaluate the arguments by Feith, Cambone, and Wurmser in support of this grand plan, two things may strike you. First, the whole scenario above assumes that Al Qaeda does nothing during this domino-toppling in the Middle East, that all of these quasi-regime changes would take place over months and years against a backdrop devoid of Al Qaeda. Secondly, what is absent in these hoped-for developments are any Israeli actions towards progress with the Palestinians, as if the current situation can be frozen for several years while our grand plan evolves.

In other words, this Administration’s world view is based on the premise that only a military solution can deal with 9/11 and the Middle East, resulting in years of occupation, war, nationbuilding, domestic terrorist attacks, deficit spending, and “Pentagon or nothing” budgeting.

I think it’s actually worse than that. These guys never believed, and even after 9/11 still don’t believe, that terrorism is a serious problem. They are focused on their geopolitical gameboard and thus are unwilling and unable to analyse the changing situation in the mid-east (or anywhere else for that matter.) They’ve got a list and they’re checkin’ it twice. Don’t confuse them with inconvenient details.

Jason Vest wrote the following in TAP in June of last year:

Why wasn’t the threat posed by al-Qaeda — the only entity in recent years to attack U.S. government installations — foremost in the administration’s mind?

There are a lot of potential replies to that question, but the short answer — and the most convincing one — is that the Bush administration was still fighting the Cold War. Hence its unhealthy obsession with that weapons relic known as the Star Wars program, and with re-creating a bipolar world in which China would take over enemy duty for the Soviet Union, while Cuba remained a vital threat. Going up against a new evil empire and its satellites, or a regional hegemon, is familiar stuff; asymmetric war against a decentralized enemy with a complex geo-theological worldview isn’t.

[…]

There’s no need to take this critic’s word for it; just visit the Center for Security Policy’s Web site. Judging from the dozens of “reports” the center has issued since the August 1998 embassy bombings, the most urgent threats to American national security are, in no particular order: China, ballistic missiles, Cuba, Iraq, and threats posed to Israel by Syria and Yasir Arafat. Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network doesn’t make the cut. Indeed, only two of the center’s “reports” since 1998 have dealt with al-Qaeda, and even those have done so only indirectly. According to the center, the most important lesson learned from the 1998 attacks was one illustrated by the U.S. retaliation against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant: that there’s no way “chemical weapons can be effectively and verifiably banned,” which proves that it’s necessary to kill any form of chemical weapons control.

It would be tempting to laugh this off if Gaffney’s group weren’t so influential. As one page on the Center for Security Studies Web site proudly notes, no fewer than 22 of the center’s advisory council members now occupy key national security positions in the Bush administration.

[…]

With Iraq spawning terrorist legions, China girding for World War III, North Korea looking to launch a missile at Alaska, and Fidel Castro plotting to destroy the Colossus of the North, there simply wasn’t any room for bin Laden in the pantheon of threats that govern the Bush security orthodoxy.

There still isn’t , even now, and that is the problem.

If Doug Feith and John Bolton say they are going to “do” Iran and Syria next, I’d believe them. Osama bin Laden, economic meltdown, worldwide opprobrium, and a breakdown of international order aren’t anticipated in the plan and are therefore to be ignored as much as possible. (North Korea didn’t cower and run as they were supposed to when faced with our manly threats, and they are confused about that but undeterred.) All of these things are distractions from the plan.

Must…follow….plan.

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