Command and Control

Reader Pi brings to my attention this post on Unintended Consequences that quotes a Stratfor article:

Ten days into the war, Iraqi command, control, communications, intelligence and information systems appear to be operational at all levels, including the national command authority. From the standpoint of U.S. war planning and doctrine, this should not be the case. The fact that it appears to be the case is shaping the war, as U.S. air power pounds these facilities in Baghdad. Clearly, the Iraqis have thought through the survivability of their systems and have made some adjustments. The United States must take down these systems. The difficulty coalition forces are having represents the first serious strategic crisis of the war. The problems the media have obsessed over are trivial

If this is so, the most basic objective of 3rd wave Information Warfare has not yet been met. It hasn’t just been a failure of the more kooky aspect of the plan — the clumsy psy-ops, “decapitation” and selective intelligence. It has not yet accomplished the one aspect of IW that everyone agrees is essential– eliminating the enemy leadership’s ability to communicate with their troops.