Yes, and-ing the next world order
by Tom Sullivan
For all the years of angst about the destiny of American leadership in the world, “the sky has refused to fall,” Daniel Drezner begins at conservative Foreign Affairs magazine. What if this time is different?
American power has weathered serious missteps such as the invasion of Iraq and economic policies that while strengthening global capitol weakened Americans’ standard of living. The country’s international standing recovered somewhat under Barack Obama, argues the Tufts professor of international politics. The United States has not only more treaty allies than any other country, but more than any country in history. But the longstanding international liberal order undergirded by American power, Drezner contends, may resemble a Jenga tower with a lot of pieces missing.
“Like a Jenga tower, the order will continue to stand upright—right until the moment it collapses,” he writes. “Every effort should be made to preserve the liberal international order, but it is also time to start thinking about what might come after its end.”
After detailing how we got here and explaining how the international order helped maintain international equilibrium in spite of our own and others’ missteps, Drezner now believes “the structural pillars of American power are starting to buckle.” In part, because America is no longer the world’s dominant economy. In part, because American foul-ups (and outright lies) led voters to distrust foreign entanglements. And in part, because Pax Americana and the all-volunteer military allowed Americans to ignore foreign policy:
The marketplace of ideas has broken down, too. The barriers to entry for harebrained foreign policy schemes have fallen away as Americans’ trust in experts has eroded. Today, the United States is in the midst of a debate about whether a wall along its southern border should be made of concrete, have see-through slats, or be solar-powered. The ability of experts to kill bad ideas isn’t what it used to be. The cognoscenti might believe that their informed opinions can steady the hands of successive administrations, but they are operating in hostile territory.
What the liberal world order may not be able to weather is an American president “who displays the emotional and intellectual maturity of a toddler” in domestic and especially in international affairs:
Most of these foreign policy moves have been controversial, counterproductive, and perfectly legal. The same steps that empowered the president to create foreign policy have permitted Trump to destroy what his predecessors spent decades preserving. The other branches of government endowed the White House with the foreign policy equivalent of a Ferrari; the current occupant has acted like a child playing with a toy car, convinced that he is operating in a land of make-believe.
How many more Jenga blocks removed will produce sudden collapse? The current moment has given the world cause to wonder the way September 11 shook Americans’ sense of invincibility to its core. Drezner hopes in ten years the “gloom and doom” of his essay looks misplaced:
The trouble with “after Trump” narratives, however, is that the 45th president is as much a symptom of the ills plaguing U.S. foreign policy as he is a cause. Yes, Trump has made things much, much worse. But he also inherited a system stripped of the formal and informal checks on presidential power. That’s why the next president will need to do much more than superficial repairs.
Beside handing back some foreign policy decisions to the legislative branch, Drezner suggests, the next president might re-value expertise, democracy, and the rule of law.
Easier said than done. First, we have to get to the next president. Just now, saving our Jenga-tower republic feels something like improv theater. We’ll need to “yes, and” ideas for firming up the foundations after control by an administration and a political party bent on smashing their toys rather than share them. We are in uncharted territory. This feels different. Familiar tools have ceased functioning in the new normal.
The problem for Democrats is their inclination to run for the safety of the familiar rather than taking a chance on a bold, new future. They tout every election as the most important of our lifetimes, but so long as Democrats tell themselves that, perceived “electability” not boldness will govern the choices of thee rank-and-file. In the wake of the George W. Bush presidency, choosing Obama felt bold, and in some sense was. Dukakis, Gore, and Hillary Clinton (in spite of her glass-ceiling potential) represented stability for party regulars, perhaps “comfort food” and electability. But the party’s track record for picking presidential winners is not comforting.
For now, there seems little interest in foreign policy among Democrats running for president. It’s not a winning issue. The party that believes it triumphed in 2018 on domestic issues intends to keep its focus there. Even impeachment is a distraction. Perhaps they can reinforce whatever crumbling foundations Donald Trump has not wrecked in 2021.
Younger voters, however, show little affection for those who led them to this pass. They are not agitating to reclaim America’s international stature. They want to hear how candidates will re-envision what’s broken here first, and not slap a patch on it. This ain’t their daddy’s USA. It belongs to them now. What comes next will fall to them to decide.